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

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

A Weekly Journal of Opinion

MARCH 23, 1992

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CORRESPONDENCE

Buffeting Buffett (cont'd.)

To the editors:

Michael Lewis seems unable to write without making mistakes. In your March 16 Correspondence, he conceded that he had been wrong in saying that Berkshire Hathaway's performance lagged the market in 1990. *But,* he said, he was right about 1991. For that year, he declared authoritatively, the S&P rose 30.5 percent while Berkshire's net worth gained only 28 percent.

Berkshire's net worth rose in 1991 by more than 39 percent. I don't know where Lewis gets his figures, but mine come from our financial statements, certified by Deloitte and Touche.

WARREN E. BUFFETT
Omaha, Nebraska

To the editors:

In "The Temptation of St. Warren" (February 17), Michael Lewis wrote that after Warren Buffett took over at Salomon, he "fired a lot of people ... a hugely disproportionate number of whom were women." This statement is false. From August 19, 1991—Buffett's first full day on the job—through February 5, 1992 (about the time I received my copy of the February 17 issue of TNR), 110 professionals were terminated. Of that number 85 were men (4.5 percent of the male professionals we employ) and 25 were women (3.5 percent of the female professionals). Also, 56 non-professionals were terminated during that period—29 men (3.5 percent) and 27 women (2.5 percent). By any measurement, whether voluntary or involuntary, fewer women than men, proportionate to their total population at the firm, had left Salomon since Buffett took over as chairman.

Last December, having heard Lewis make essentially the same misstatement on the TV talk show "Charlie Rose," I called both Charlie Rose and Lewis and informed each of them that Salomon under Buffett in fact had *not* terminated a disproportionate number of women. I also offered to send Lewis the numbers; however, he told me that sending them was unnecessary.

ROBERT F. BAKER JR.
New York, New York

The writer is director of corporate communications for Salomon Brothers.

Michael Lewis replies:

The numbers for Berkshire Hathaway came from a recent article in *Business Week* surveying the poor performance of market stars, which Buffett did not dispute. On television last November I said that it was strange, after announcing his desire to take the machismo out of Salomon Brothers, that Warren Buffett had appointed nine men to run the place, and, in a round of cutbacks, had fired more women than men. (The data came from a non-public relations source inside Salomon Brothers.) Robert Baker called later—while I was at work on the article under discussion—to tell me that, in fact, only a little more than 49 percent of those fired were women, which, he conceded, was still disproportionate to their population at the firm. That is what I wrote in my article. It appears that between the time the article was written and the time it was published Salomon Brothers managed to fire a few more men. I suppose they should be congratulated on the speed of their response.

Capital pains

To the editors:

"A Capital Gains Primer" (February 10), Michael Kinsley's otherwise thorough argument against enacting new tax breaks for capital gains, should have mentioned a few salient points concerning existing tax law. First, as far as the partisan battle on capital gains is concerned, it was Dan Rostenkowski's tax reform bill (passed in late 1985 after nearly being killed by House Republicans) that would have excluded 42 percent of long-term capital gains from taxable income. It was Republican Bob Packwood's Senate bill that provided for an equilibrium in rates between capital gains and ordinary income (ostensibly to "simplify" the lives of taxpayers), not to mention the onerous passive loss rules accused of wrecking the real estate industry.

With respect to incentives for investing in new companies, an existing statute, Section 1244, provides a tax break for purchasers of stock in new small business corporations: if the deal goes sour, up to $100,000 of loss from the sale or worthlessness of the stock can be written off against any type of income.

Finally, Kinsley implies that the $3,000 annual limitation on deducting net capital losses is a creation of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. In fact, a capital loss limitation has always been part of the Internal Revenue Code. However, under prior law, net long-term capital loss carryovers had to be used up two-for-one; in other words, you needed $6,000 of unused long-term losses to get a $3,000 deduction. The 1986 act eliminated this rule and increased the tax benefits of capital losses to investors.

ROBERT THEE
Flushing, New York

Poe pourri

To the editors:

As a firm believer in Poe as an almost faultless technician, I must make a minor demurral to Christopher Benfey's admirable review of Kenneth Silverman's *Edgar A. Poe* ("Anatomy of Melancholy," February 24). Benfey's reference to Poe's own description of his words "as nearly to the ludicrous as was admissible" suggests that Poe is admitting that certain lines of "The Raven" are ludicrous. But as the placement of that phrase in Poe's *The Philosophy of Composition* shows, the words refer to more than the simple image of the raven. Poe was referring to the tone and ambience he was creating, particularly to the contrast between the outward appearance of the bird (which was ludicrous) and its traditional meaning as a sign of death.

Furthermore, the bird appears after the putative narrator has apparently dipped into black magic in the hopes of calling up the dead Lenore. This apparition of a "messenger of death" freaks him out. To keep his hold on reality, the narrator jocularly voices the lines Benfey sees as "ludicrous" and thereby begins a dialectical exchange that leads from bluster to faint hope, then to denial and rage, and finally to despair. And through it all, Poe gives the reader and any beginning serious writer a lesson in how to use the qualities of a common symbol to create a specific emblematical sign.

NORMAN RUDNICK
Oakland, California

Futures

To the editors:

Let me try to formulate a resolution to the dispute between Michael Kinsley (TRB, "Untried and True," January 20) and Jeff Faux, president of the Economic Policy Institute (Correspondence, February 17). We have three major economic problems that federal tax cuts and/or spending increases might do something about: the stubbornly persistent recession; the stagnation over the last eighteen years or so in our productivity and international competitiveness; and the growing gap between rich and poor.

And one powerful constraint—the federal budget deficit. Of course the deficit matters. Faux is right in asserting that it matters much less in a recession: increased spending (of any kind) will generate increases in savings and induce

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additional investment as well. But it matters very much over the long haul—which could mean in as little as a year or two. The immense increase in the federal deficit accounts for all of the decline in our net national savings rates, from an average of approximately 8.2 percent of net national product during the three preceding decades to only 3.4 percent during the 1980s. And that decline—not the beastliness of the Japanese—explains our transformation from the world's biggest creditor to the world's biggest debtor and our balance of trade deficits, which have in turn depressed the foreign exchange value of the dollar and threaten our future living standards.

This means that we have to look for the combination of budgetary policies that gives us the biggest bang for the buck along all three fronts, while increasing the federal deficit as little as possible.

A temporary cut in personal income taxes, to demonstrate our suddenly developed political love affair with the "middle class," comes out last on all counts. These families are likely to spend only a very small portion of any additional dollars; and stimulating more consumption generally is the worst possible way of attacking our long-term problems. The percentage of our real GNP that we devote to consumption has already risen frighteningly over the last forty years—from an average of 58.5 percent in the '50s to 64.6 percent in the '80s.

We also devote too large a proportion of our resources to housing for our long-term good. We should therefore equally violently oppose credits for home purchase, stimulating though they may be. And credits for increased savings, however desirable in the longer run, are the last thing we need in a recession.

The only acceptable short-term remedy is the one that Faux himself espouses and I'm confident Kinsley would agree is urgently needed: give $20 billion or so to the states at once to avoid further big tax increases and massive cuts in their outlays for Medicaid, welfare, and education. I would add to that the restoration of unemployment compensation benefits to their levels of twenty or so years ago.

Apart from these, we have to put our eggs in the investment basket. That puts tax credits for incremental private investment at the top of the list, for the short-term, and more liberal depreciation for the longer run, along with increased government investment in infrastructure, people, and technology.

What offset the sharp rise in consumption as a percentage of our real GNP over the last four decades was the decline in the proportion devoted to government purchases of goods and services, from 25.1 percent to 19.8 percent. The reader may find this surprising, especially in light of the enormous increase in government entitlements programs over this period. The reason is that the latter outlays, along with interest on the federal debt, are treated as mere transfers, and so are not included in the GNP accounts. They show up instead in the increase in the proportion of GNP devoted to consumption, which the entitlements programs helped make possible. The sharp relative decline in government purchases of goods and services reflects largely the progressive starvation of government *investment* programs that Faux rightly deplores.

It follows from my listing of our major


FRANK RICH: THE ASPEN ESTABLISHMENT
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problems and constraints that increased federal investment expenditures should be financed to the greatest extent possible by cuts in military spending. As Faux points out, however, they would in any event be worth going into debt for.

ALFRED E. KAHN
Ithaca, New York

The writer is Robert Julius Thorne Professor of Political Economy, emeritus, at Cornell University.

Bushido

To the editors:

Some statements in Joanna Pitman's "Repentance" (February 10) make a reader pause. Never mind that Hakudo Nagatomi says he's 79 years old although born in 1916. It's mainly that claim to have fought in China from 1945 to 1957.

"For twelve years after the Japanese surrender in 1945, Nagatomi fought on in China, first with Chiang Kai-shek's army against the Communists." Well, maybe so, but I'd have asked: Which campaigns? To which Nationalist army were you attached? For how long did this fight go on? Were you part of a Japanese unit? Or were you serving as an individual in Chinese Nationalist ranks?

His second assertion is that he "fought on in China ... with Japanese resistance fighters secretly planning to relaunch the offensive for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Talk about Bushido!

Despite attempts to stimulate armed resistance against the Chinese Communists from outside—mostly from Taiwan—there was no effective resistance after 1949 and certainly not for the next eight years. So there's another set of questions here: When did all this go on? Where did these Japanese troops, using China as a base for relaunching the Co-Prosperity Sphere, hide out all that time?

Postwar Japanese generations should be acquainted with the atrocities committed by the Japanese in China—in Nanking in particular—as well as in Southeast Asia. But undistorted, historically accurate—there's something pat, glib, too plausible in Nagatomi's story. His remarks ring with the spurious enthusiasm of a scripted Chinese Communist confession.

JOHN HORTON
Hollywood, Maryland

Joanna Pitman replies:

I would like to acknowledge my slip over Hakudo Nagatomi's date of birth. He is 79 years old, born in 1913. Mr. Nagatomi fought on in China for twelve years after the Japanese surrender—not as a member of a Japanese unit, but as an individual. With a small number of other individual Japanese soldiers—only a few hundred, as Mr. Nagatomi recalls—he formed a band of men who privately and secretly hoped to build up support and relaunch an offensive for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Yes, this was Bushido. These men had pledged their lives to fight for the emperor of Japan. They refused to accept either the defeat of Japan or the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek.

Get real

To the editors:

Only someone "who has had the advantage of ... being in Washington for the past twelve years" (Robert Shapiro, "Get Real," February 17) and works for something with a name like "Progressive Policy Institute" could imagine that we out here thought Bush's State of the Union address was a "polished, even stirring, oration."

SELDEN K. SMITH JR.
Durham, North Carolina

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FROM WASHINGTON

Reagan's heir

Even before he left office, the bitter conservative joke was that things had been different "when Ronald Reagan was still alive." Now it's no joke. It's Pat Buchanan's rallying cry and the general conservative lament: all the nation's economic problems and all the Republican Party's political problems are due to George Bush's abandonment of Reaganism. If the reports are true, even Reagan himself believes this.

What a fantasy. In fact, George Bush is Ronald Reagan's legitimate heir. His policies are an extension of Reagan's, and the country's problems are more the result of those policies than of any imagined departure from them. If Reagan were alive today, he'd be in the same boat that Bush is, paddling in the same direction.

Count number one in the apostasy indictment is the 1990 budget accord, with its tax increase. On NBC's "Meet the Press" on February 23, Vice President Quayle blamed the Persian Gulf crisis—"the tough responsibility he had in facing down Saddam Hussein"—for forcing Bush to make this distasteful concession to the Democrats in Congress. That is a remarkably stupid lie. On June 26, 1990, when Bush issued his famous statement endorsing a tax increase, Saddam had not yet invaded Kuwait and the Bush administration was still sucking up to the Iraqi dictator. But budget deal revisionism is clearly going to feature in the presidential campaign, so let's get the story straight before the myths ossify.

In 1990 the Gramm-Rudman law was still in effect, providing for automatic across-the-board budget cuts if the projected deficit did not meet certain targets. The target for fiscal 1991 was $74 billion. It was Bush who initiated negotiations with congressional leaders in May, when it was becoming clear that the deficit would be far larger. Both sides quickly agreed on a goal of reducing the deficit by $50 billion in 1991 and $500 billion over five years. Never, at this point or later in the contentious process, did Bush propose spending cuts of this size.

Bush always had three alternatives to a tax increase. He could have proposed spending cuts to make a tax increase unnecessary. He could have allowed the Gramm-Rudman chopper to slash spending automatically. Or he could have abandoned all pretense of fiscal discipline and allowed the deficit to grow unmolested. No one forced a tax increase on him, despite his best efforts to make it appear that way. Bush concluded that reneging on his no-new-taxes pledge was the least politically damaging option.

And, despite the hits he's taken, Bush was right. The voters who are fuming at the tax increase would be fuming even more if he'd proposed an honest $500 billion in spending cuts. You can't get that kind of money out of waste, fraud, abuse, and welfare. What happened in 1990, in short, is that Reaganism's decade-long bluff was finally called.

Of course the 1991 deficit ended up not $74 billion but $268 billion. The difference is mainly due to phony accounting—a White House tradition dating back to David Stockman's "Rosy Scenario." But conservatives would like to blame the budget deal for the gap, and for the recession: proof, they say, that tax increases harm the economy and thus reduce government revenues. The argument is absurd. The 1991 tax increase was $20 billion; the five-year total was $146 billion. Amounts like these cannot send a $6 trillion economy into a tailspin.

George Bush did not depart from the Ronald Reagan tradition of rejecting tax increases because there is no such tradition. Like Bush, Reagan often "whispering 'I will ne'er consent'—consented." In 1982 he repealed about a third of his 1981 tax cut. As Reagan's biographer, Lou Cannon, writes, "He persuaded himself that he had merely agreed to 'tax reform.'"

In 1983 Reagan signed the biggest tax increase in history, the Social Security tax hike. Without the surpluses that one generated, this year's federal deficit would be approaching $500 billion. Also in 1983 Reagan actually proposed a 5 percent income tax surcharge, to be imposed if the 1986 deficit was more than 2.5 percent of GNP. (In the event the deficit was more than double that, but the surcharge had fallen by the wayside.)

The 1986 tax reform, regarded by Reagan as one of his greatest achievements, was "revenue neutral": it raised some people's taxes, cut others'. On balance the working poor and middle class paid less, the affluent paid more. Yet today, when Democrats propose a similar revenue-neutral tax shift, Bush promises to veto it as a "tax increase."

Has Bush betrayed Reagan's legacy on taxes, spending, and the deficit? According to the latest Congressional Budget Office figures, Bush has actually *reduced* the federal tax burden, measured as a share of GDP, from 19.2 percent in fiscal 1989, Reagan's last year, to 18.9 percent projected for 1992. Spending, true, has soared, from 22.1 percent to 24.9 percent. And as a result the deficit has doubled, from 3 percent to 6 percent. On the other hand, during Reagan's recession of the early 1980s, the deficit hit 6.3 percent.

And Bush inherited more from Ronald Reagan than just a set of alleged principles. Among other things, he inherited a national debt that had almost tripled in eight years, from $785 billion to $2.2 trillion. Interest on that debt will be $201 billion this year (not counting another $71 billion paid into mythical "trust funds" for Social Security and other future obligations). By my calculation, that 1992 interest payment would be about $133 billion less if Bush had inherited from Reagan a national debt the same size as the debt Reagan inherited from Jimmy Carter.

Bush also inherited the savings and loan fiasco, which will cost the taxpayers $67 billion in 1992—plus interest on what previous years' payments have added to the national debt. If it weren't for these two legacies from Reagan—interest on the debt, and the S&Ls—the projected 1992 deficit would be about 3 percent of GDP. That's as good as Reagan ever did, even in the boom years. (Carter's last deficit, just for comparison's sake, was 2.7 percent.)

The truth about federal spending is that George Bush—just like Ronald Reagan—has approved no major new domestic spending programs or serious increases in existing ones. But—also just like Reagan—he has done nothing to stop the relentless increase in the cost of middle-class entitlement programs that is really driving the budget. To be sure, Reagan's culpability doesn't let Bush off the hook. But Bush's culpability certainly doesn't let Reagan off the hook either. They are co-conspirators.

On social issues, too, the accusation that Bush has somehow abandoned Reaganism is misplaced nostalgia. It is hilariously fitting that those lurid scenes of gay men dancing in chains, featured in Pat Buchanan's commercial attacking the National Endowment for the Arts, turn out to be from a film funded under Ronald Reagan, not George Bush. Reagan occasionally talked a hard-right line on social issues like prayer in schools and abortion, but he did very little about them. And the reason was similar to the reason for his failure to cut government spending: he was not one to let ideological purity get in the way of re-election. Reagan's winning coalition, like Bush's, included many voters with no special

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

MARCH 23, 1992

UNGUARANTEED

By whatever standard one measures it—moral or pragmatic—the Bush-Baker policy toward Israel is a failure. Not only is the administration both threatening to withhold loan guarantees for the housing of Jews from the former USSR unless Israel ends settlements in the disputed territories and ham-fistedly attempting to replace Israel's government. It is siding with Israel's enemies in the peace talks that the United States is supposed to be brokering honestly, and seeking to undermine Israel's support in Congress and among Americans by exaggerating the cost of aid to Israel. The tone of Bush-Baker statements to and about Israel now borders on contempt.

The administration's attitude certainly cannot be explained by concern for the well-being of Palestinians or about the illegitimacy of one country's occupation of another. President Bush's solicitude for subjugated peoples is thin, even for Palestinians. Led by Bush's friend, the Emir of Kuwait, the Gulf Arabs are in the process of expelling nearly half a million Palestinians who have lived in the region for generations. Bush looks the other way. Syria occupies Lebanon without U.S. complaint, and China brutally occupies Tibet with Bush using his veto to support Beijing.

But the more immediate problem with the American position is that it is likely to be counterproductive. By pressuring Israel on settlements *before* the peace negotiations, the chance for a real deal on the settlements *at* the negotiations is greatly diminished. Without such a deal, Likud governments in Israel are likely to populate the West Bank so heavily with Jewish settlements that territorial compromise will become impossible. Since 1983 the number of Jewish settlers has boomed from 30,000 to more than 100,000, and the figure is still growing at an alarming rate. It is because we oppose such settlements that we oppose the administration's current strategy.

It is worth remembering that no comparable pressure is being placed on Israel's enemies. The administration has forgotten previous proposals that the Arabs halt West Bank violence and cancel the anti-Israel economic boycott in return for a freeze on settlements. Worse, the intervention creates every incentive for the Arabs to avoid concessions in the expectation that America will "deliver Israel." Moreover, the effect of U.S. policy on Israel is likely to be the exact opposite of what the administration and we hope for. Former Premier Yitzhak Rabin, Israel's most popular politician, is now leader of the Labor Party. He favors a land-for-peace swap with the Arabs, with safeguards, and would halt "political" settlements in the West Bank, limiting new construction to security requirements. He accuses Likud of wasting precious money on settlements that should be spent to employ ex-Soviet Jews. The administration obviously wants Rabin to win Israel's elections in June. But by meddling, Bush and Baker risk a right-wing backlash in Israel. Already Likud politicians are accusing Rabin of being "Washington's boy."

When Baker was asked in a House hearing on February 24 why Israel was being singled out for special conditions on its aid, he replied, "Nobody else is asking us for $10 billion in addition to $4 billion we give every year with no strings attached." This was a ploy to use anti-foreign aid sentiment in Congress to undermine support for Israel, and the statement itself was doubly false. Other countries do get generous aid: Egypt a $7 billion loan forgiveness last year, and Iraq up to $5 billion in loan guarantees before the war. And, second, Israel is *not* asking for $10 billion in aid. It wants loan guarantees enabling it to borrow $10 billion of the $70 billion Israeli economists think they'll need to absorb the former Soviet Jews. This emigration is a huge triumph for the United States. If accomplished, it could also be an economic coup, since well-educated ex-Soviet Jews could help turn around Israel's economy. Bush and Baker are threatening both triumphs with their crude tactics.

Why? Persistently, Bush and Baker betray a conviction that the fundamental impediment to peace and harmony in the Middle East is Israel's occupation of Arab lands. It is not. The fundamental problem is forty-five years of Arab hostility to Israel's existence, exemplified in Saddam Hussein's vows to destroy the Jewish state, the continuing arms buildup in Syria, and the financing of that buildup by Saudi Arabia. If and when the threat diminishes, Israel's public will elect leaders prepared to trade land for peace. They might even do so this year, if the White House does not add to their fears by threatening American support. •

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NOTEBOOK

GIVE THAT GUY AN NEA GRANT: "Ours is a great state, and we don't like limits of any kind. Ricky Clunn is one of the great bass fishermen. He's a Texas young guy, and he's a very competitive fisherman, and he talked about learning to fish wading in the creeks behind his dad. He in his underwear went wading in the creeks behind his father, and he said—as a fisherman he said it's great to grow up in a country with no limits ..." —Bushism of the week, February 28, at a Houston rodeo

TSLEAZE: The award for most misleading ad of the week goes to Mr. Squeaky Clean himself, Paul Tsongas, whose spot capitalizing on a Bill Clinton gaffe set a new low in the campaign for cynicism. Clinton had lambasted Jesse Jackson on an open microphone, when he was (erroneously) informed that Jackson had endorsed Tom Harkin. Jackson had promised Clinton he would stay neutral. When the mistake was pointed out, even Jackson brushed it off, but Tsongas shamelessly exploited it, pandering to the black vote, and subtly implying by the order of sentences that Jackson had even endorsed Tsongas: "He didn't wait for the facts. No. Bill Clinton didn't wait to find out if it were true. He just attacked.... All because Bill Clinton heard a rumor that Jesse Jackson might have endorsed someone else for president. Paul Tsongas. Paul Tsongas is running for president." It's the kind of ad one might expect of one of the least principled, most politics-as-usual candidates. Paul Tsongas. Paul Tsongas sure is running for president.

MACULATE CONCEPTION: There's at least one healthy unborn child in the world that many pro-life advocates would rather didn't exist. It's the one developing in the womb of a 14-year-old Irish girl, raped by her best friend's father. Despite a decision by the Irish Supreme Court to allow the girl to have the operation in England, her plight has put pro-lifers in an excruciating—but revealing—quandary: either they support the Irish government's official position, which forces even rape victims to give birth, or they must reconcile themselves to the notion that, in some cases, there's an overwhelming humanitarian case to place limits on the fetus's absolute right to life. So far, few have acknowledged the dilemma. If they do—and we hope the Irish case prompts such a reflection—the chances for a more constructive moral dialogue improve.

EXCESS MAIL: We offer our own personal experience of congressional abuse of the franking privilege. On one day (Monday, March 2), TNR received *eighteen* franked press releases from Colorado Senator Hank Brown. Two of the addressees are deceased; another hasn't worked here for over a decade. What were these vital bulletins about? "Brown Introduces Bill to Cut $1.5 Billion in Porkbarrel Products," said one. Economy, senator, begins at home.

RISE AND FALL:
"In the European republics of the former Soviet Union the statues of Lenin have all been toppled from their pedestals...." —*The New York Times*, February 16

"DONETSK, Ukraine—... Lenin's statues and Communist symbols and slogans still adorn this town, as they do Kiev, Ukraine's capital.... 'Not one statue has been removed in the entire region,' said an engineer." —same paper, same page, same day

(thanks to Guenter Lewy, Washington, D.C.)

RULES ARE RULES: A man is convicted of murder and condemned to death. Suddenly, days before his scheduled execution, new evidence emerges casting serious doubt on the credibility of the original conviction. So the execution is delayed while the court considers the new evidence, right? Not so fast. According to a recent ruling by an appellate panel in the case of Texas death-row inmate Leonel T. Herrera, "Herrera's 'actual innocence' claim does not allege a ground upon which habeas relief can be granted." In other words, from a procedural standpoint, Herrera's guilt or innocence is irrelevant. If this opinion is upheld by the Supreme Court, a possibly innocent man will die for the sake of the integrity of the Texas criminal justice system. We are all called upon to make sacrifices for the public good. This one seems a bit extreme. •

The truth about Japan's teens.

CLIFF NOTES

By Bruce S. Feiler

During a recent cross-country tour to promote a book about my year as a teacher in rural Japan, the largest number of questions I received revolved around the topic of death. What Americans wanted to know was if Japanese companies are so efficient, why do their employees work themselves to death? And if Japanese schools are so successful, why do their students commit suicide so often?

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Children in Crisis

BY ALBERT SHANKER, PRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

When a great disaster, like a hurricane or an earthquake, strikes people in our country, the president often declares a state of emergency. This mobilizes resources; it cuts through red tape; and it focuses attention on the people who are in danger so they get the help they need—and get it right away. Several weeks ago, leaders of the American Federation of Teachers from across the country called on President Bush to declare a state of emergency for America's poor children and to devote some of the peace dividend to their pressing needs.

There have been many reports and studies about the state of our youngest and poorest citizens. So we know that 20 percent of U.S. children under 18 are now living in poverty and that the number will rise to nearly 25 percent by the year 2000: That's one child in four. We know that nearly 10 million of the 36 million Americans who do not have health insurance—and therefore decent health care—are children. But facts and figures like these have not moved the government to action.

These children depend on us for their future, but we also depend on them.

The AFT leaders talked about the realities behind the statistics, realities that teachers and all those who work with children in the schools face every day. They talked about children who come to school hungry and sick and exhausted. They talked about children who are beside themselves because of some tremendous upheaval at home. Maybe a parent has been laid off or an older brother sent to jail. Teachers and paraprofessionals have always helped their students deal with problems like these; they've considered it part of their job. But the problems are increasing in number and getting more severe. At the same time, schools have fewer and fewer resources.

Over the past ten years, the federal government reduced its financial responsibility for programs like Medicare and Medicaid and passed more and more of it on to the states. As a result, states have had less to spend on education. The current recession has meant that money for education has been trimmed even further; and local governments, also pinched by the recession, are unable to pick up the slack.

So school budgets have been slashed. Teachers have been laid off, and, in many districts, guidance counselors, psychologists and school nurses are a thing of the past. Classes are crowded: A teacher who used to teach 25 kids in a class might now have 40—but still only books for 25. Teachers and paraprofessionals are overwhelmed. And the increasing number of kids who desperately need help often are not able to get it. The schools themselves are falling apart: Roofs leak; toilets and washbowls don't work.

These problems do not affect children who belong to one ethnic group only or who live in one part of the country. As Sandra Feldman, president of New York City's United Federation of Teachers, said, "Poverty does not discriminate; it destroys urban and rural children, white, African-American, Latino and Asian children alike." U.S. schools are now working to achieve the education goals for the year 2000 set forth by the president and the nation's governors. If we hope to achieve these goals—and to remain a competitive and healthy democracy in the next century—we can't ignore America's poor children. These children depend on us for their future, but we also depend on them.

President Bush answers this challenge by saying that he cares very much, but that our country can't afford to spend any more money. We know that's not true. We know there is an enormous peace dividend: money we no longer need to spend defending ourselves from external enemies. What better way to spend it than to acknowledge the emergency our poor children are facing and target money to programs that will give these kids the chance to get the education they need?

Most of the programs we are talking about are already in place, and we know they work. Here's what we have in mind:

- An additional $2 billion for Chapter 1. Half would provide Chapter 1 services for one million educationally disadvantaged kids who don't get them now; the other half would be used for full-day early childhood education for 4- and 5-year-old children.
- An additional $800 million for the Education for All Handicapped Children Act. This would increase the federal government's payment to the states for the education of handicapped children.
- An expansion of Medicaid to provide elementary school counselors who would help children facing temporary health or emotional crises and keep children from being inappropriately placed in special education programs.
- An additional $1.75 billion for Head Start. This would increase the number of children served and expand coverage to include 3- and 4-year-olds.
- $2.5 billion to fund health clinics at or near schools.
- $500 million (the first year) for a 5-year public works program to help rebuild schools.
- $100 million for other special programs for homeless children and those needing bilingual education or English as a second language.
- $2.5 billion for local programs for child care, prenatal care and preventive health care.
- $100 million for additional training for math and science teachers.

This is real money, but it's no gamble. And if the money is transferred now, it would start making a difference by September.

Victims of floods and earthquakes didn't bring their misfortunes on themselves, and we help them rebuild their lives. How can we deny poor children the chance to *build* theirs?

MR. SHANKER'S COMMENTS APPEAR IN THIS AD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS. READER CORRESPONDENCE IS INVITED. ADDRESS YOUR LETTERS TO MR. SHANKER AT THE AFT, 555 NEW JERSEY AVE., N.W., WASHINGTON, DC 20001. ©1991 BY ALBERT SHANKER.

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You can understand why Americans might think Japan's deadly work habits a problem. The news media are constantly running stories about the Japanese phenomenon of *karoshi*, literally translated as death from excessive work. This term, invented by the Ministry of Labor in the late 1980s, allows the government to provide compensation to the families of workers who die from heart attacks or other diseases caused by working long hours. But despite the outpouring in the American press, including recent stories on CNN, "20/20," and in *The Washington Post*, only thirty cases qualified as *karoshi* in 1990, a figure that U.S. Labor Department researchers suggest pales in comparison to the number of Americans who die from work-related stress every year.

But the more persistent myth is the suicidal tendencies of Japan's overpressured students. The supposedly excessive work habits of the Japanese are believed to be fostered in schools, where students attend classes five-and-a-half days a week, up to 250 days a year. Students in the system are widely depicted as being under such pressure to perform and pass university entrance exams that they kill themselves at inhuman rates. Again, press reports corroborate these impressions. In Japan "teen suicides and the relentless pressure to succeed are well-documented," declares *The New York Times* (March 24, 1991). "Japan's demanding education system causes teen suicides," agrees *The Washington Post* (March 9, 1990). The suicide rate in Japan is "unusually high," warns *The Seattle Times* (June 11, 1990). Whenever so many people agree on a story without citing a source, a simple check of the facts is in order.

According to the World Health Organization, the overall suicide rate in Japan is one-third higher than in the United States, placing it just under the top ten countries in the world in self-inflicted death. Among juveniles, however, the figures tell a different story. In 1989, 1,407 Japanese between the ages of 15 and 24 committed suicide, for a rate of 7.5 for every 100,000. In the United States, 4,929 people in this age group took their own lives, producing a rate that is 75 percent higher than in Japan. Among those under 15, the U.S. rate was twice as high. In a broader comparison, China, the Soviet Union, Germany (FRG), Denmark, Bulgaria, and Ecuador all had higher rates of youth suicides than Japan. Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Norway, Hungary, and Austria had rates more than double those in Japan. The Finnish figure was three times higher, and Sri Lankan juveniles took their own lives at a rate ten times higher than their counterparts in Japan.

If these figures are so clear, why does the image of the suicidal Japanese prevail? One reason is the myth of the kamikaze spirit. Like their prototype General Tojo and their hero Yukio Mishima, the Japanese are often portrayed as warriors, schemers, and group fanatics who devote themselves obsessively to achieving their goals and kill themselves if their plans are thwarted or their company stock loses value. A second reason, closely related to the first, is that most of the American media seem content to rehash these outdated images of Japan without regard to the facts of a changing population. A recent article by Colman McCarthy in *The Washington Post*, for example, derided the Japanese as "eighty-hour-a-week stiffs" and said the result was "workplace harikari." This turn of phrase neatly tried to combine both Japanese stereotypes.

Finally, and most troubling, Americans seem to use images like these to perpetuate the myth that the Japanese are exotic and so inextricably different from us that we could not possibly learn from them. Japanese schools in particular have many problems, including excessive regulations and a lingering disrespect for diversity, but turning students into hard-working, productive citizens is one of their undisputed strengths. Producing stereotypes is one of ours.

BRUCE S. FEILER is the author of *Learning to Bow: An American Teacher in a Japanese School* (Ticknor & Fields).

Paul Tsongas's will to power.

THE PURITAN

By Sidney Blumenthal

Paul Tsongas, the self-proclaimed moderate, is a zealot. He is on a mission of personal redemption that holds out redemption to the voters as well if only they will recognize his superior virtue. "At least I'm honest," he replied to Bill Clinton, who had accused him of being "perfect." By pulling the lever for Tsongas, by offering up the gesture of belief in him and his thin bible, we can ascend to a new level of "spirituality," as the candidate promised in his New Hampshire victory speech. With his wins in Maryland and Washington state on March 3, his narrow messianism tailored for the suburbs has now carried him further than anyone, even Tsongas himself, had ever expected.

From the moment of its initial success, Tsongas's campaign has been wrapped in a mythology: his recovery from cancer leading to both personal and intellectual renewal. Thus he presented his post-cancer epiphany, his insight that the Democratic Party could be revived only if it swallowed his "pro-business" prescription. Not only the Democrats, but America itself, needed to be put into an intensive care unit.

But the essence of this mythology—his revelation brought by suffering that can lead to salvation—is only half true. No one can deny or fail to be moved by Tsongas's psychological renewal in the face of illness. But it did not have any political or intellectual parallel. Today's Tsongas is yesterday's Tsongas with a more compelling personal history. I remember visiting him eleven

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years ago, in his large Victorian house in Lowell, and listening as he spelled out his views, which are virtually identical to what they are now: hostility to the Democrats' "disrespect for the private sector" and mild disapproval of Reagan. "If you could have had Reagan elected and Carter sworn in," he said, "you would have had the best of both worlds." Tsongas's entrance into presidential politics is not so much the act of someone who has glimpsed a prophetic light as it is Rip Van Winkle-like—an awakening into a strange world. Tsongas missed much of the 1980s, and he wishes to restage it on his own terms. He is certain that he is the better manager than Bush, a truer successor to both Reagan and Carter.

Tsongas presents himself as the tolerant wise man. But in fact, his unassuming demeanor and self-deprecating wit are the mask of puritanism. The son of immigrants who assumed the mantle of the Yankee legacy is what Randolph Bourne once described as "a true Puritan." "The true Puritan," he wrote in 1917 in "The Puritan's Will to Power," "is at once the most unselfish and the most self-righteous of men. To the true Puritan the beauty of unselfishness lies in his being able to enforce it on others." Tsongas's self-effacement is a form of domination. His goal is not the pursuit of happiness, but the pursuit of pride. The others, obvious in their ambition, are profane by comparison. And the cancer makes his strategic moral positioning almost unassailable. He uses his illness not only as metaphor but as a passive aggressive defense. When pressed about his pro-nuclear power stand by a student, Tsongas snapped, "Don't lecture me about cancer"—a peculiar appeal to authority.

"The problem with Paul is not his insincerity. It's his sincerity," said William Taupier, the former city manager of Lowell, who is now a real estate broker. "He really believes he has the answer. The implication is that the others are not honest. That's the one thing in Paul's political personality that's most repugnant. I find it difficult to deal with the fact that when you disagree with Paul, it's immoral."

Tsongas is part of an unexamined realignment. As working-class whites defected from the Democrats, upscale liberal Republicans, like Tsongas, entered. He has been a very lucky politician, winning races for the House and the Senate against wounded opponents. In the constellation of Massachusetts politicians, Tsongas was allowed to occupy a unique slot as a contrarian. Unlike Dukakis, he did not have to struggle to build coalitions of the urban and suburban, the blue and white collars, to govern a fractious state. Dukakis's defeat in 1982 had forced him to reconstruct the party, even if his approach was mechanical. His underlying rigidity remained, but he was a far more politically encompassing figure than Tsongas, who, despite his humor, is as arrogant as Dukakis. Unlike Ted Kennedy, Tsongas carried no burden of the fragmenting national party. And he never had to deal directly with the tangled politics of race, like Boston Mayors Kevin White and Ray Flynn. Rather, Tsongas cast himself as the "pro-business" gadfly, positioned beyond the muddle of the others, whose labors allowed him the luxury of his stance. The Democratic Party was largely irrelevant to him, except as a foil.

Whatever publicity he gained nationally, he remained the most important politician in Lowell. Even as a senator, he embroiled himself in the minutiae of the city council and school board. His claim to have singlehandedly revitalized the aged mill town, particularly through his sponsorship of the Lowell National Urban Park, was his ultimate point of pride. After his recovery, anxious about his family's financial security if he were to die, Tsongas joined a State Street law firm, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, which paid him more than $200,000 a year, according to *The Wall Street Journal*. His fund-raiser, Nick Rizzo, acted as his agent in getting the distinguished former senator appointments to a number of corporate boards, which brought him more than $120,000 a year in director's fees, according to *The New York Times*. As a lobbyist, Tsongas exercised his influence for a wide range of corporate clients. For $3,000 a month, he was hired by Michael Milken's Drexel Burnham Lambert to introduce Drexel to Massachusetts officials, according to the *Journal*.

Running for the presidency had been Tsongas's plan since he had come into the Senate. He was more ambitious than most, though he shrouded his drive with moralism. With his recovery from cancer, he felt the urgency of time. Though no one really gave him a chance, he was hailed for his courage. But his profession as a lobbyist casts in a different light his decision to run early. Tsongas is no longer "pro-business" in a disinterested way; he is in business. It is indeed easy for a lobbyist to run because it is an advertisement, especially if the platform is "pro-business." Yet there is also an integrity to what Tsongas is saying that has greatly helped him. Voters immediately sense that he is natural in his rhetoric, not having contrived it for this purpose. What they have not fully grasped is that he now has the clients to match his convictions and that this provides his underlying consistency.

Even before the onset of Clinton's adversities, Tsongas had cast himself as the one who tells the hard truths. His "Call to Economic Arms" was an emblem of his thoughtfulness, though it was written in a didactic, simple, even sometimes simpleminded manner. In contrast to the consummate politician Clinton, Tsongas has emerged as the anti-politics candidate. In this he is a symbolic candidate, a triumph of imagery—riding the slick wave of the new simplicity. The candidate who, in a televised debate, asked all the others to "raise your hand" to renounce negative advertising was the first to use it. For a Democrat, his pro-business stance seems fresh, but it is as polished a stance as any of Clinton's. If Tsongas's lines emanated from Bush's mouth, he would be excoriated as a Hoover. If any Republican had Tsongas's client list, he would be hounded by the press for conflicts of interest. But Tsongas has succeeded in mystifying the demystified. With him, less is more.

His vision for the country's future is prosaic: Lowell,

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his own Massachusetts miracle. His hometown reflects his own story, a city with "what had seemed a marginal future" that is now "a national model of urban renaissance." But since 1985, when trouble hit the high-tech industries, Lowell has faced the same problems of decline that have plagued the rest of Massachusetts. All the economic projects that Tsongas worked on in Lowell, from the downtown hotel to the Wang training center, have in fact failed. Tsongasism in one city is a curious, downsized parody of Dukakisism in one state.

Tsongas's wins are premised on a narrow constituency of affluent, suburban new class voters. He is not a coalition candidate, never having built a political coalition in his long career. When he describes a coalition he uses the familiar categories of primarily upper-middle-class constituency groups: feminists, environmentalists, business, gays. Tsongas, however, makes little effort to build a broader coalition because he has little idea of a broader party. His opposition to a middle-class tax cut may appeal to his base but shows disdain for those who might marginally benefit from the measure and for the notion of more economic equality. He also fails to grasp the politics behind it, the need to win back alienated working-class voters, especially whites. The cut may not amount to much as economics, but it may be that only by means of politics that society can be made more whole.

Tsongas's attraction for the affluent is that he is more honest, more real, more thoughtful—all signs that he is less political. But on race, welfare, crime, and class inequality—all the truly formidable issues that must be at the center of any debate about reforming the country—Tsongas has little to say. He permits his rhetoric of sacrifice to do his political work. Uttering his sound bite—"No more Santa Claus"—has been enough to turn many of the well-educated into believers. His minimal idea of the party's role in remaking society is equaled by his minimal conception of the presidency. "My only job as president is to make the economy grow," he has said. His pinched sense of the social compact—which he presents as novel—is traditional in its anti-political subtext. It is what Republican businessmen have always held against the Democrats since Roosevelt.

Like Pat Buchanan, Tsongas is running against Bush as a betrayer of his legacy. For the liberal Republican, however, it is a different and earlier legacy: that of the old Yankee. Tsongas assails Bush as inauthentic; he promises to be Bush with a rudder. Unlike George, he has mounted a campaign that Prescott Bush would have been proud of. But, in the end, the social problems of the country are not subject to sheer management. The ultimate contest, moreover, is not even of plan versus plan; nor is it a test of personal virtue. Individual reform—personal redemption—will not be sufficient. Only the unholy practice of politics offers the slightest hope of salvation. But it may be that the suburban Democratic electorate, in a demonstration of collective rectitude, will prefer to seek shelter with the Puritan who holds out the illusion of the hard truth. •

The CPUSA expires.

THE END

By Harvey Klehr and John Haynes

In December 1991 some 500 people met in Cleveland for the twenty-fifth convention of the American Communist Party. The Cleveland City Council welcomed them with a resolution praising the Party's "proud history in the defense of democracy, civil rights, and peace." The convention was closed, however, not only to the press and public; officials and hired guards kept out even members who lacked leadership-approved passes. Party leaders refused to seat delegates from Communist clubs in New York, Northern California, Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, Alabama, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. These disqualified delegates were among the 900 out of a total membership of 3,000 who had signed an "Initiative to Unite and Renew the Party," which questioned the policies of Party leader Gus Hall.

Delegates inside the convention were treated in similar fashion. When one Hall critic, James Jackson, got up to speak, his microphone was cut off. Herbert Aptheker, a leading Party intellectual, was allowed to address the crowd. A shaken man, he linked the crisis of communism to the fact that it had been "authoritarian, domineering, brutal, and guilty of colossal crimes—not only suppression but also massive human extermination." Aptheker, the former hard-liner who had supported the Soviet invasion of Hungary and once called critics of the Communist Party "racist, war-inciting, enemies of humanity, rotten to the core," now found himself on the receiving end of similar invective. Hall's supporters denounced the dissidents, including Aptheker, as "enemies within," "traitors," and "viruses."

When it was over, the convention ratified Hall's continued leadership by a 2-to-1 margin. The Party's new National Committee contained no one from the New York or Northern California districts, the two largest, and excluded every initiative signer including Angela Davis and Aptheker. The Party's newspaper, the *People's Weekly World*, has yet to say what happened. At the last minute Party officials removed an article by Carl Bloice, an editor and initiative supporter, that included an account of the convention. Hall's lieutenants also accused the editor, Barry Cohen, of tampering with the paper's computer files. They changed the locks on the newspaper's offices and replaced its staff with loyalists. Cohen and the dissidents absconded with the mailing list; they sent subscribers an indignant letter and Bloice's article.

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These semicomic death throes were almost entirely a consequence of the Party's ideological and emotional ties to the Soviet Union. The decline of other radical groups and the Party's determination to step up its recruiting had led to a modest but steady growth in membership in the 1980s. By the mid-1980s Communists were edging back into mainstream politics, supporting efforts by Jesse Jackson and the Rainbow Coalition to transform the Democratic Party. A few prominent labor leaders, some city officials, and even a few members of Congress began to associate themselves with Communist-aligned organizations such as the United States Peace Council and the Labor Research Association. At LRA's 1990 awards dinner, for example, both Jackson and New York Mayor David Dinkins spoke.

Then came the sting from the East. Three long-time Party leaders published an article in the *People's Weekly World* revealing that at a CPUSA meeting the day after the attempted coup in the Soviet Union last August, Party officials offered justifications for the coup and Gorbachev's removal, "some not even suggested by the plotters themselves." On an audio tape sent to fellow leaders on August 20, Hall warned that the CPUSA should not join "the bring back Gorbachev bandwagon." The National Board of the CPUSA, the article revealed, then voted to "neither condemn nor condone" the coup. In addition to James Jackson, the authors of the article were Charlene Mitchell, the Party's candidate for president of the United States in 1968, and Danny Rubin, a Party leader since the late 1950s. The three denounced the National Board's action on the coup as "a shamefaced apology for a reactionary, illegal, and indefensible act."

That the Party newspaper would publish so harsh an attack on Hall's leadership was a sign that dissension had reached crisis levels. Because the coup failed quickly and the Party no longer published a daily paper, Hall was spared the embarrassment of a public endorsement of the plotters. By the time the Party's National Committee met on September 8, Hall backtracked, condemning the "illegal, unconstitutional takeover of power," but adding a denunciation of Gorbachev for supporting Yeltsin's "anti-Communist witch hunt." The National Committee rejected the "neither condemn nor condone" formulation by a close vote.

The dissidents then issued their Initiative to Unite and Renew the Party in October. It was no repudiation of the CPUSA's history or even of Soviet communism. It continued to support Marxism-Leninism and expressed no admiration for multiparty democracy or political pluralism. However, it spoke of "a fresh look and making necessary adjustments" in view of events in the Communist world and allowed that "the crisis of the socialist societies in Europe over the last few years makes it evident that there were deep-going flaws in the model of socialism being constructed there."

As mild as this was, the initiative was too much for Hall. After dealing with its signers in Leninist fashion at the Cleveland convention, he assured the faithful: "There is no basic flaw in the theories of Marxism-Leninism or dialectical materialism." He asserted that socialism was in trouble in the Soviet Union due to the "attack by pro-capitalist, right-wing elements" and because under Gorbachev "no one defended socialism, its history and achievements." He charged dissidents in the CPUSA with "right opportunism," and rejected "such concepts as proportional representation and minority/majority positions" that the dissidents wanted as "contrary to the nature of the Party."

What does the future hold for the American Communist Party? The dissidents have formed committees and announced plans for a newsletter, a conference, and participation in the 1992 presidential election. As for the CPUSA, Hall is in firm control, but with the exodus of the dissidents its membership will likely contract sharply. The Party has survived other rifts, but this one is likely to be fatal. Even in 1959 it did not drop below 3,000 members. Moreover, the end of Soviet communism has caused the CPUSA practical as well as ideological problems. Last October Alexander Drosdov, editor of the Russian newspaper *Rossiya*, reported that newly opened Soviet archives indicated that the USSR had provided $21 million in subsidies to the CPUSA over the previous ten years. That's some deficit to make up.

The split leaves the Party at the level of the small Trotskyist sects that do little more than issue turgid newspapers. But for Hall, hope springs eternal. "If you want to take a nice vacation, take it in North Korea," he recently advised. He may soon be in need of one.

HARVEY KLEHR AND JOHN HAYNES are co-authors of the forthcoming *The American Communist Movement: Storming Heaven Itself* (Twayne).

MANILA POSTCARD

QUEEN FOR A DAY

By Alan Berlow

Back in Manila after an involuntary five-and-a-half-year exile in the United States, Imelda Marcos, the Philippines' best-known performance artist and former first lady, has taken center stage in the country's presidential election. Surrounded by a gaggle of lawyers, journalists, security goons, her personal priest, a Chinese geomancer, and assorted sycophants, she resides in the $2,000-a-day "Imperial Suite" of the Plaza Hotel. From there she descends to the metastasized decay of urban Manila, which she tours in a silver-gray stretch Mercedes limousine.

Costumed in designer silks, her trademark hanky aflutter, a huge diamond on her finger, Imelda moves

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from one stage to the next in her self-appointed role as "Mother of the Nation." The "Mother" is a fractured, kaleidoscopic character. One day she appears with urban squatters as props. On another she comforts victims of the Mount Pinatubo volcano. She tells them she is penniless and homeless just like them: "The one gift I can give my people is my extreme sensitivity to suffering, to pain.... As long as I see people who are deprived, who are persecuted, who are impoverished, my work is not done." Her work, such as it is, can best be described as self-promotion. Her promises to provide homes, food, and medicine to the victims of various calamities are just promises. For Imelda, it's the thought that counts.

The Mother of the Nation also plays the country's archetypal victim. She appears periodically at the Manila City Hall to be photographed and fingerprinted in connection with the umpteenth fraud and tax evasion charges filed against her (charges unlikely to stick, thanks to the ineptitude of the Aquino government's prosecutors). Imelda, who spent twenty years pillaging the Philippines with her dictator husband, is indignant and unrepentant. "More than life, I value my good name," she declares. "We have been so maligned." One of her good names is "Jane Ryan," which appears on her $356 million Swiss bank account. But never mind, she says her husband never stole a centavo. "Marcos was a giver, not a taker," she pouts, and many believe her. "If I were guilty, would I look like this at 62? Wouldn't all that ugliness show on my face?"

The Filipinos probably aren't nutty enough to elect a certifiable fruitcake like Imelda. Her biggest problem is that most have seen her show, or variations on it, before. Although her return to the Philippines has gotten an absurd amount of publicity, and although she—and her husband—still command a loyal following, she is playing to less than packed houses and consistently scores at the bottom of public opinion polls. Despite their reservations about Aquino, few Filipinos care to relive the Marcos years; and although Imelda has bundles of money to buy votes on election day, May 11, she lacks the other sine qua non of Philippine politics, a political machine to dispense the money and get people to the polls. Thus she is a long shot for the presidency.

Even if Imelda loses, however, the Marcos legacy may be revived. Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco Jr., an estranged cousin of Corazon Aquino's, was one of Ferdinand Marcos's closest cronies and is the godfather of the Marcos's only son, Ferdinand Jr. Cojuangco fled the country in 1986 aboard the same plane as the ex-president and Imelda, and he now has a well-organized nationwide campaign and is a leading candidate for the presidency. Cojuangco prudently rejected Imelda's offer to run as her vice president, but he carries the albatross of his friendship with Marcos unapologetically and is likely to pick up Imelda's supporters if she drops out of the race.

With a financial interest in more than 200 corporations, Cojuangco is probably the wealthiest man in the Philippines. Under Marcos he was granted a monopoly over the coconut industry and now gives every reason to believe that his main interest in becoming president is to consolidate his wealth further. When I asked him if he sees any difference between his own financial interests and those of the Philippine people, Cojuangco said: "I don't think so. I would like to think that my personal interests run parallel with this country." He recently told his party's convention, "I will be the chief executive of all the sectors of the economy." The Aquino administration's failure to reduce unemployment, the 70 percent poverty rate, and widespread violence have convinced many people that they may need less democracy and more of a strongman.

If so, Cojuangco is the man. He says there was no loss of press freedom under Marcos, that the right of habeas corpus was never abridged, and that Marcos was not a dictator. In 1984 the U.S. Embassy in Manila had a few words to say about Cojuangco. One cable to Washington noted his "reputation for being ruthless and for demanding total control in his areas of responsibility." Another stated: "Nearly everyone ... is afraid of Cojuangco, especially in light of the near fatal attack on Assemblyman Emmanuel Pelaez, Cojuangco's most outspoken critic." Pelaez, a former vice president and now Philippine ambassador to Washington, was seriously wounded during an attack in which his driver was killed. Although Cojuangco denies any involvement and his participation was never proved, the embassy cable noted that "it was universally assumed that Cojuangco was behind the attempt on Pelaez's life."

Many people continue to fear Cojuangco today, among them Aquino, who identifies her cousin with the worst abuses of the Marcos dictatorship. Nevertheless, Cojuangco is widely respected as a businessman and financial manager. As for the corruption charges, he points out that the Aquino government has had six years to make a case against him and has failed to do so. He has also had uncanny success in convincing educated members of the country's elite and the military that he was the only crony who did not send his money abroad. This is seen as a mark of social conscience.

Cojuangco's candidacy received a significant boost from the chronically indecisive Aquino, who belabored the choice of a successor for months. When she finally anointed her former defense secretary, Fidel Ramos, it created a major split in her own party: between Ramos and Ramon Mitra, a colorless patronage politician and close friend of Cojuangco's. Pundits have already narrowed the field of eight candidates to Cojuangco and Mitra, the only two with sizeable funds and organization, and with Ramos faltering, Aquino may be forced to opt for Mitra.

That's not to say that other candidates don't exist. The Filipino answer to Jerry Brown are two populists, Senator Joseph Estrada and Miriam Defensor-Santiago. Estrada, an enormously popular ex-movie star who is seen as a champion of the little guy (because of his screen roles), is renowned for his below average intelligence. Santiago is a former Aquino administration official with a reputation as a "graft buster" and windbag.

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She has consistently scored high in opinion polls. Unfortunately, neither offers a compelling vision for the country, and neither has emerged as the heir to the mantle of Aquino's "People Power" movement. For that matter, neither has anyone else. In 1986 Filipinos had a choice between St. Cory and the evil dictator. This year it's more like Imelda and the seven dwarfs.

ALAN BERLOW is a free-lance writer living in Manila.

The latest S&L sleazeball.

BANK ROBBER

By Glenn R. Simpson

You probably knew the reputation of Congress was sullied by the S&L scandal. You probably also knew that some of its members have been tied to the rogue Bank of Credit and Commerce International. What you probably didn't know is that the two great banking scandals of the day are substantially linked. The main connection is David Paul, former CEO of CenTrust Savings Bank, a Miami S&L that was seized in February 1990 and will cost the government $2 billion to clean up. Paul's indulgences (million-dollar yachts and jets, Old Masters paintings), his $300,000-plus in campaign contributions, and his lobbying recall the granddaddy of S&L kingpins, Charles Keating. Political intervention helped keep CenTrust open for two years after it otherwise would have been closed, and involved Senators Alan Cranston of California and Donald Riegle of Michigan, two of the Keating Five. But recently it's become clear that Paul's thrift also came under BCCI's sway four years ago.

Like Keating, Paul knew that the way to ingratiate himself with politicians was to help them raise campaign money. The Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, whose Majority Trust Paul chaired, was the locus of his fund-raising and lobbying efforts. Among the senators most grateful to Paul was John F. Kerry of Massachusetts, the white knight of the BCCI scandal, who chaired the DSCC in 1987-88. "Once again, your assistance is above and beyond the call of duty," Kerry wrote in an October 1988 note after Paul let the senator hold a fund-raiser on his $6 million Miami estate. "We are *very, very* appreciative." On October 18, 1988, Kerry dropped another line after Paul gave the senator, along with Senator John Breaux of Louisiana, a lift up from Miami on his jet: "Thanks for making a special stop to drop us off in Washington."

The DSCC chairman for 1989-90 was Breaux, who wrote to Paul in September 1988 shortly after he was named to succeed Kerry. "You are doing a great job as chairman of the Majority Trust.... If I can be of assistance to you in any way, please know that you need only give me a call." To be sure Paul didn't think this was just a form letter, Breaux appended a handwritten note: "You are a great American." Breaux aide Noel Gould, the former chief financial officer of the DSCC, had praise of his own. "You are two of the best God has put on earth," he gushed in a handwritten Election Day 1988 letter to Paul and his wife, Sandy, "and I am sure after you, God declared victory and retired! Honestly, I have never been with two people who are both brilliant and human, in love yet independent, energetic but with enough time and concern [to] spend quality time with friends, and kind enough to take me into their counsel."

This is Georgia Senator Wyche Fowler's August 1988 reply to Paul's invitation to a $100,000 French Chef's Dinner, for which the culinary maestros were flown in from Paris: "I do try to take my public office seriously," wrote Fowler, "however, I have found politics alone a paltry and unsatisfying diet. You are very kind to invite me to your international culinary extravaganza on Oct. 29 at your home." Paul initially tried to bill this culinary extravaganza to CenTrust but ended up paying for it out of his own inflated salary when federal regulators raised a stink. "I look forward to seeing you again under any circumstances," concluded Fowler. "To avoid confusion with the congressional mail, please write to me at my home address..."

By September 1991 substantial evidence had emerged that Paul had taken up these offers of friendship to engage in various Keating-like schemes. In April 1989, for instance, during congressional debate over the S&L bailout bill known as FIRREA, Paul had his attorneys draw up a pro-CenTrust amendment, then faxed it to Breaux, Kerry, Senate Banking Committee Chairman Riegle, Representative Doug Barnard of Georgia, and that magnet for favor-seeking S&L high rollers, Cranston (who, according to one Paul letter, represents the American dream of what an elected officer should be). Paul ultimately did not get what he wanted, thanks to an amendment that Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio forced upon his colleagues. There is, however, a lengthy letter from Kerry in which the senator assures Paul that he ordered his staff to investigate the matter.

In June 1988 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board proposed a new regulation that would have required CenTrust and other thrifts to mark-to-market, i.e., list all holdings of stocks and bonds at their real value rather than their purchase price. The prices of most of CenTrust's junk bonds and other securities had declined so greatly that revealing their true value would have shown CenTrust was insolvent, so Paul hired lobbyists to defeat the proposal. Specifically, he paid the Washington firm of Camp, Barsh, Bates & Tate $90,000 to set up a front group benignly dubbed the Housing Investment Alliance. HIA commissioned a quick report from the highly regarded Wharton Econometric Forecasting concluding that the rule would hurt the housing market. At

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a press conference on September 20, 1988, Senator Alfonse D'Amato of New York, waving the report, blasted the rule and called for a postponement.

Another Paul lobbyist appears to have provided a Cranston aide with a draft letter calling on the Bank Board to postpone action on the rule, which was duly sent on the senator's letterhead on September 22. Cranston's office has denied the letter was sent on behalf of Paul, and Cranston banking aide Carolyn Jordan, whose dealings with Keating were investigated extensively by the Senate Ethics Committee, says she doesn't recall sending the letter. But federal investigators have a tape recording in which an unidentified lobbyist tells Paul that Jordan is sending the letter and remarks, "I assume that it's very similar to the draft we provided her earlier this evening." And the lobbyist and Paul also discuss assurances from Cranston that the Bank Board will accept the letter despite its being two days late (the comment period for the rule ended on September 20). The regulation was not issued until more than a year later, in December 1989; CenTrust failed two months after that.

CenTrust's involvement with BCCI is even more extensive than its interaction with S&L scoundrels. By mid-1988 CenTrust owed its very survival to BCCI and one of the bank's key alleged front men, Ghaith Pharaon. The Saudi businessman, who along with Senators Kerry and Fowler was one of the select invitees to Paul's French Chef's Dinner in 1988 (he even helped hire the chefs), allegedly assisted BCCI's secret takeover of First American Bankshares of Washington, D.C., in the early 1980s and played a similar role at CenTrust. In May 1988 Pharaon was a major CenTrust stockholder, and he persuaded top aides to then-FHLBB chairman M. Danny Wall to approve a CenTrust bond issue over the advice of Bank Board accountants. The bond offering brought new capital into CenTrust and improved the condition of its books just in time for the thrift to pass a crucial examination by regulators.

The government now says the $150 million debt sale was a sham designed to fool the regulators. BCCI and an alleged front company for the now-defunct Drexel Burnham Lambert bought a large portion of the bonds, only to sell them back to CenTrust shortly after the regulators finished their examination. CenTrust suffered a loss of at least 30 percent, which is now being picked up by U.S. taxpayers, while Pharaon, BCCI, and the alleged Drexel front enjoyed a return of more than 15 percent, according to one estimate. In late February Paul and Pharaon were indicted by a federal grand jury on fraud charges involving this transaction. The charges against Paul also include fraudulent dealings with Keating.

CenTrust was a virtual BCCI subsidiary by mid-1988, so it is curious that Kerry, who doggedly pursued the BCCI case for years through his narcotics and terrorism subcommittee, was cozying up to Paul during this period. Kerry says he wasn't aware of Paul's BCCI connection, and there's no evidence that it affected his own investigation. But in testimony before Kerry's panel on November 21, Assistant U.S. Attorney Mark Jackowski said Jack Blum, Kerry's own former investigator, contacted him and a Customs official in March 1989 and "told us that the upcoming termination of the subcommittee's investigation was sudden, unexpected, and suspect." According to Jackowski, Blum claimed that someone on behalf of BCCI had "gotten to" or paid off this subcommittee in order for it to terminate its investigation. (Blum has staunchly denied ever making such an allegation.) Jackowski also made reference to documents, which have not been made public, that "contain passages concerning efforts by certain individuals to get this committee to stop its investigation." Replied Kerry: "We are very aware of that."

The tangled lines connecting Congress, Paul, and BCCI continue to unwind. One more juicy detail is that Pharaon owned a vacation home on the tiny, private Bahamian island Cat Cay, and he and Paul traveled there together with their families. Guess who else had a place on Cat Cay? Charles Keating.

GLENN R. SIMPSON is a reporter for the Capitol Hill newspaper *Roll Call.*

The Hezbollah's late leader.

MUSAWI'S GAME

By Martin Kramer

Israel did not extend its long arm to claim the life of Sayyid Abbas al-Musawi, the beturbanned Shiite cleric who led the "Party of God" in Lebanon. A brush of the hand sufficed. The Israeli operation depended upon Musawi's overconfidence. February 16 is always a day of rallies for Hezbollah: on that date in 1984 another Shiite cleric was killed in the town of Jibshit, the movement's southernmost outpost in Lebanon. Jibshit remained dangerous ground, where Israel's helicopter-borne commandos abducted still another cleric in 1989. Would Musawi now defy precedent to demonstrate Hezbollah's presence in the deep south of Lebanon? Would he address a rally in Jibshit itself, right under Israeli binoculars?

He did not disappoint the townspeople of Jibshit—or the Israelis. Unlike Hezbollah's other clerics, whose limos rarely venture beyond Beirut and Baalbek, Musawi had often skirted Israel's security zone. During a decade of militant preaching, he had come to feel invulnerable. Now, as Hezbollah's new leader, he thought nothing of descending to Jibshit to parade the movement's flag. Musawi even arrived with his wife and one child, as though he were an everyday politician on the hustings.

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

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He paid with his life and theirs, when Israeli helicopter gunships destroyed his motorcade as it left the town.

Israel killed Musawi because he commanded an escalating war against what he called "the cancer of Israel." Yet upon his death he was pigeonholed as a "moderate" by some in a fashionable Western misreading of Islamic fundamentalism. Before this makes of Musawi a wholly mythic figure, it is worth telling his story straight. His remarkable career combined a mastery of theology and weaponry rare even in Hezbollah. More important, it shows how fundamentalist Islam works to thwart peace—or any new order that denies it the satisfaction of perpetual jihad.

Musawi was born in the town of al-Nabi Sheet in the Bekaa Valley in 1952. Many years would have to pass before the Bekaa earned its preeminence in the global drug market. In those days the valley's clans of farmers and herders still lived in isolation from the world—and from Islam. Musawi would have seen little proper religion in the backwater of his childhood. But in 1968 he met Sayyid Musa al-Sadr, the spellbinding cleric from Iran who forged a movement to champion the rights of Lebanon's Shiites. Their conversation, in Beirut's al-Awza'i neighborhood, determined Musawi's calling.

The 16-year-old Musawi had heard about the Institute of Islamic Studies in Tyre, which Sadr had helped to establish. Sadr encouraged him to matriculate, and Musawi left for Tyre, then for nearby Burj al-Shamali, where the institute moved during his studies. In 1970 Musawi chose Islam as a career and left for the Shiite shrine city of Najaf in Iraq. In those days Najaf's great seminaries drew Shiite students from around the world. They congregated in its courtyards and beneath its great domes, immersing themselves in sacred texts, piety, and poverty. Musawi remained there for nine years, reaching the highest stage of formal preparation.

In Najaf he quickly fell under the spell of Shiism's liberation theologians, who murmured against the Baath regime in Iraq and orchestrated revolution in Iran. An old man named Khomeini also spent those years in Najaf, spinning theories of an Islamic state. When this kind of preaching grew militant, the Iraqi police grew suspicious of foreign Shiites and began to expel them. Musawi, on the brink of completing his formal studies, was also forced out, and he returned to Lebanon in 1978.

An improbable vision fired Musawi on his return: Baalbek, the rude market town of the Bekaa Valley, would replace sublime Najaf as a center for religious study. The notion seemed fantastic, for Shiism survived largely as a superstition among the Bekaa's clans and tribes. Not a single cleric could be found in most villages of the valley. Yet Musawi did not discourage easily. He helped to found a new school, the Imam al-Mahdi Religious Seminary in Baalbek, which worked to shake the Bekaa from its spiritual slumber.

The great change in Musawi's life came in 1982. Defying all odds, Khomeini had come to power and promised Islamic revolution for all. He sent Revolutionary Guards, his most zealous emissaries, to remake Lebanon in Iran's image. Musawi threw open the doors of his seminary to the Guards, who used it as their principal center until they established their own base. Musawi took the very first military course offered by the Guards, and it left an indelible impression upon him—as great as that of his formal studies in theology and law:

> I recall one of the sights I can never forget. We were awakened at night by the weeping of the brethren Guards during the night prayer. Is this not the greatest school from which one can graduate? I also recall when one of the brethren Guards gave a weapons lesson. Suddenly, after he had given all the explanations, he put the weapon aside and swore an oath saying: "All I have explained to you will not help you; only God can help you."... When I joined the Guards and sat with the brethren in the first course they gave in the Bekaa Valley, I felt I derived immense benefit. I felt I had truly penetrated genuine Islam.

The intense energy that powered this camp soon exploded: its graduates began to detonate themselves next to Islam's enemies. In October 1983 the most devastating of the suicide bombings leveled the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, claiming 241 lives. As Musawi attested, the school of the Guards "made the Muslim youths love martyrdom. And so we were not surprised at all when, shortly after the arrival of the Guards, a Muslim youth in Lebanon smiled at death while carrying with him 1,200 kilograms of explosives." The bombings transformed Hezbollah, amplifying the words of its clerics. Their mosques filled with bearded, uplifted faces.

By virtue of his rhetorical and military talents, Musawi was made commander of the Islamic Resistance Movement, the arm of Hezbollah entrusted with spreading a jihad along Israel's northern border. Musawi stuck close to the front during these years, urging Hezbollah's fighters ever southward. "Our goal is not the liquidation of Israel's border zone in Lebanon," he would tell them. "Our slogan is the liquidation of Israel." He gained his own renown for two especially deadly bombings: one that killed twelve Israeli soldiers in March 1985, and another that killed eight soldiers in October 1988. Not surprisingly (as he would say), both operations were suicide bombings.

Hezbollah rewarded Musawi in May 1991 when its consultative council appointed him secretary general, the movement's highest post. The choice represented a shift in Hezbollah's priorities. With the crushing American victory over Iraq, the Rafsanjani regime saw no further profit in the continued detention of Western hostages by its Lebanese clients. Yet Iran dreaded the new impetus in the Arab-Israeli peace process. It searched for sticks to jam the gears of the peace process—and there was no better stick than Hezbollah. The movement might be too weak to scuttle the process, but it could set one of Israel's frontiers ablaze if peace drew too near.

Musawi was an ideal candidate to supervise the retooling of Hezbollah. He had always left hostage-

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holding to other clerics and would readily help Iran to free those remaining, whose release allowed Syria to bask in Washington's favor. But Musawi exacted a price: Syrian acquiescence in Hezbollah's free movement between its Bekaa Valley bases and southern Lebanon. During Musawi's tenure as secretary general, the number of attacks against Israel's security zone increased by a factor of ten over the previous comparable period. Musawi succeeded in translating each freed Western hostage into another dead Israeli; ten Israeli soldiers were killed during his term as leader, and another sixteen were wounded.

Musawi traded American hostages for a clear shot at foiling American policy, now heavily invested in the Arab-Israeli peace process. His attacks against Israel's security zone constituted a jihad against the very idea of peace. The danger, as he saw it, was not Israel's military presence in the security zone, but Israel's willingness to withdraw from the security zone—in return for full peace with Lebanon. Hezbollah's mission has been to deny Israel that peace. If it could kill enough Israelis, perhaps Israel would settle for a combination of U.N. and Lebanese security guarantees—something far less binding and durable than a peace.

SAYYID ABBAS AL-MUSAWI BY VINT LAWRENCE FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

Israel's killing of Musawi and its mini-war against Hezbollah have now cleared the air. Lebanon won't get back its south by indulging Hezbollah; it will have to sign a peace accord with Israel. Lebanon and Syria will still try to outmaneuver Israel over the south, and may allow Hezbollah a bid for revenge. In the meantime, however, they have gruffly ordered Hezbollah's fighters back to their bases in the north, ending the movement's free run of the frontier. And while the final disarming of Hezbollah is not in sight, the plans are coming out of drawers.

Hezbollah, however, is far from finished. Its surviving leaders have discovered the new loophole of Arab politics: democracy. Taking a page from the Algerian fundamentalists, the "Party of God" is now disguising itself as a plain political party. Musawi's successor (formerly known for his kidnapping zeal) is already speaking smooth talk to Lebanon's other parties. Hezbollah's demand is simple: the people of Lebanon should be allowed to decide whether they want an Islamic state. Muslims are a clear majority in Lebanon, and Hezbollah believes it can do as well as any fundamentalist party in turning discontent into ballots for Islam. To Lebanon's Maronite Christians, the die-hard opponents of an Islamic state, Hezbollah promises a regime of tolerance that has supposedly been the hallmark of Islamic rule since the days of the Prophet.

This plan of sweet reason is really an attempt to abduct the process of internal reconciliation now under way in Lebanon. All the other parties are agreed: Lebanon can only be reconstituted on the basis of (reformed) confessionalism. In a polity composed of Muslims and Christians, government must avoid the tyranny of the majority. Hezbollah's proposal to put Islam to the vote undermines the fragile accords that offer the best chance for reconciliation in Lebanon. And it endangers further peace talks with Israel.

Lebanon's secular elites of all sects recognize Hezbollah's ploy for what it is. The authoritarian rule of Islamic law on the Iranian model is hardly the basis on which they want to rebuild their once-cosmopolitan world. And they know the idea of Islamic tolerance to be an apologetic myth. But the Muslim masses are up for grabs, and it's not impossible that Hezbollah might capture their imagination. The call would then go up for "real" democracy—from the same voices that justified abductions and still denounce the West for its vile corruption. Alas, corrupt it is: Hezbollah's kidnappers-turned-candidates will doubtless win the endorsement of the democracy salesmen of the West, who would eagerly sell Islam the rope to hang the few real moderates left in the East.

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

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by **EDWARD SOREASHELL AND NANCY SOREASHELL TOO**

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Blacks, whites—and statistics.

THE MYTHS OF RACIAL DIVISION

By Andrew Hacker

The urge to emphasize racial division in America is hard to resist. Few nations have etched so deep a black-and-white separation as our own. Even South Africa allows for Coloureds, while Latin countries have mulattos and mestizos, as well as Creoles and quadroons. But here even children of mixed marriages end up regarded as black. And while citizens may cherish their European origins, being white retains primacy in most of their minds. At times, race seems to surpass even gender as our major schism.

It shouldn't. We now have information about how much impact race has in areas such as school achievement, hiring, family life, and crime—and it should spur us to rethink the actual impact of race and ethnic separatism. If anything, there is evidence that race is becoming a *less* salient factor for growing groups of Americans. Here follows a brief debunking of a variety of black-and-white myths, which, upon inspection, turn out to be grayer realities.

The black family is disintegrating, while the white family remains intact. Since Daniel Patrick Moynihan's 1965 report found black families trapped in a "tangle of pathology," conditions seem to have gotten worse. Two-thirds of black babies are now born outside of wedlock, and more than half of black homes are headed by women. A majority of black youngsters live only with their mother; and in most of these households she has never been married.

Almost everyone agrees that the increases in nonmarital births and female-headed households are causes for dismay. But why should race be the crucial variable? Readily available reports show that low income and education outweigh race in causing family instability. Absent fathers abound in depressed counties where the residents are almost wholly white. In rural Maine, for example, out-of-wedlock rates exceed those for blacks in several states.

As it happens, extramarital births and households headed by women are subject to social trends, which touch all races and classes in similar ways. The Census figures for female-headed families for the last four decades show that both black and white families have disintegrated at virtually identical rates. In 1950, 17.2 percent of black families were headed by single women, against 5.3 percent of white families (a black-white multiple of 3.2). In 1990, the figures are 56.2 percent and 17.3 percent respectively (a black-white multiple of 3.2). Plainly, what we have been seeing are not so much race-based differences as concurrent adaptations to common cultural conditions. True, the black figure has always been three times larger, and here is where "racial" reasons have an influence of their own. But those forces were at work well before 1950, prior to talk about "pathology." Of course, the current 56.2 percent rate for black households is depressingly high. But then the 1990 figure for whites is almost identical to the one for blacks lamented in Moynihan's report.

The point here is not whether family structure is important, but whether its dynamic over the last thirty years has been different along racial lines. It hasn't been. Given the ubiquity of absent fathers—black and white—little will be gained by lecturing one race on its duties. To call on black Americans to show greater discipline would seem to suggest that only they have deviated from national norms. Black families will become more stable when all households evolve a stronger structure.

Where out-of-wedlock births are concerned, there is actual racial convergence. What we hear most is that 66 percent of black births are to girls and women who are not married. However, close study of the figures reveals that the black-white multiple is less than half of what it was forty years ago. So while black out-of-wedlock births are at an all-time high, the white ratio has been ascending at a far faster rate. Even in typical mid-American cities such as Davenport, Iowa, and Dayton, Ohio, the current white figures are 27.8 percent and 31.4 percent. In 1950, 16.8 percent of black births were out of wedlock, while 1.7 percent of white births were (a black-white multiple of 9.9). In 1970, the proportions were 37.6 percent and 5.7 percent respectively (a multiple of 6.6). Today, the figures are 66 percent and 16 percent (a multiple of 4.1). The chief reason for the decrease in the multiple is the availability of abortion. Although black women constitute only

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13 percent of women of childbearing age, they account for more than 30 percent of the pregnancies terminated each year.

Blacks are far more likely to commit crimes than whites. When we hear allusions to "crime," our first image tends to be of violent assaults—rape, robbery, murder—not insider trading or embezzling. And "black crime" conjures up Willie Hortons, whose acts of terror forever scar their victims' lives. By every measure we have, black felons commit far more than their share of the most dreaded crimes. While constituting only about 12 percent of the population, they account for 43.2 percent of arrests for rape, 54.7 percent of murders where the perpetrator is known, and 69.3 percent of reported robberies.

Does this mean that blacks on the whole are less law-abiding? Bruce Wright, a black New York judge, came close to saying just that when he argued that felons of his own race are simply breaking "a social contract that was not of their making in the first place." In fact, we know much less about offenses by whites, since their crimes tend to be office-based, or involve insurance claims or tax evasion, fewer of which are uncovered or apprehended. Although white-collar crooks can and do end up behind bars, many more do not. There is reason to believe that larcenous proclivities exist in members of every race but since more alternatives are open to whites, they have less need for thievery that threatens physical harm. (Class constraints are also more likely to make whites repress hatred or rage that could propel them to rape or murder.)

Because we fear more for our bodies than our bank accounts, violent crimes are more apt to bring prison terms, which explains the disproportionate number of blacks behind bars. But how far is their race the reason? What we can say with some assurance is that people who end up as inmates tend to be lower class, and represent a rougher and tougher element within that economic stratum. The prison rolls in West Virginia and Idaho are overwhelmingly white, and most inmates were convicted of crimes that in other states tend to be associated with blacks. (While West Virginia's and Idaho's overall crime rates are relatively low, their ratios of violent to non-violent crimes do not differ significantly from those of states having larger black populations.)

Blacks now outnumber whites in our penal institutions, but this was not always so. In 1930, 76.7 percent of inmates were white; as recently as 1970 the number was 60.5 percent. In contrast, blacks made up 22.4 percent of the prison population in 1930 and now make up a staggering 45.3 percent. This would suggest that black men were much more law-abiding half a century ago, since most then lived in the South, where they could have been sent to the chain gang with relative ease. In fact, controls exerted by churches, the authority of elders, and community pride combined to deter conduct that could land black men in trouble. Given the depth of poverty and endless humiliations, this discipline is all the more striking.

At the same time, the past had a much larger class of whites who used or threatened violence. The Jimmy Cagneys of New York's Hell's Kitchen and the George Rafts who filled the cells at Sing Sing portrayed an actual segment of the population. Indeed, what is often seen today as "black crime" used to be predominantly white. Since those days many if not most whites have moved up to the middle class, so those who are drawn to larceny have less need to commit face-to-face felonies. The flip side is that blacks now constitute a much larger share of the poor, and more of them live in urban centers where earlier controls no longer apply. As a result, they preponderate among those being charged and imprisoned for the kinds of crimes poorer people are more likely to commit.

Blacks score less well on objective IQ tests. Ours is an age of machine-graded tests, so much so that a single score can determine a person's future. The Scholastic Aptitude Test, which more than a million high school seniors take every year, is the first thing colleges consider when assessing applicants. Do the tests discriminate? Quite obviously they do. Children from better-off families usually do better, since they go to schools that familiarize them with the format. Students with a mathematical bent usually score well throughout the SAT, as do those with a flair for solving puzzles at a one-a-minute rate.

The problem is that black Americans as a group do not do well on standardized tests. This holds true for job applicants and civil service promotions, even when special courses have been arranged. An analysis of the SAT results shows that blacks still lag behind other groups even when they come from homes with comparable incomes and parental educations. The average SAT scores for students whose parents earn between $50,000 and $60,000 are 955 for Asians, 947 for whites, 879 for Hispanics, and 790 for blacks. For those whose parents have a graduate degree, the average SAT scores are 1053 for Asians, 1018 for whites, 897 for Hispanics, and 830 for blacks. Can there be a bias in the SAT that hampers even privileged blacks?

The first answer is that if there is a bias, it is not "white" in character. As the scores show, Asians rank ahead of whites when backgrounds are held constant, just as Hispanics outperform blacks. Asians and Hispanics do better on this American test because they study longer and harder, pay attention to the rules, and are less likely to cavil about the oddities of the test. If there is a bias to the multiple-choice matrix, it favors what might be called a technocratic mentality, which is emerging in Seoul and Bogotá as much as in Seattle or Baltimore.

But why so visible a black gap at every social level? Here the causes are explicitly racial, in that they stem from the segregation that affects even black youngsters from professional homes. Simply stated, the intellectual processes most black children learn, which tend to be at odds with technocratic modes, are reinforced by

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COMMITTEE ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The undersigned believe that the essence of U.S. national security policy should be the protection and expansion of the community of nations that: (1) Safeguard the personal and property rights of their citizens, (2) Limit their own governments' powers within the rule of law, (3) Respect the rights of other nations and (4) Otherwise apply to themselves the standards of democracy that are the pride, but not the exclusive province, of Western civilization. In support of these objectives, we have joined together to form the **COMMITTEE ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST.** We advocate support for a U.S. policy toward Israel that would – in contrast to current American policy – reflect the traditional, strong American support for the legitimacy, security and general well-being of the Jewish State: a proven, valuable, democratic friend and ally of the United States.

PRAGMATIC AND MORAL CONSIDERATIONS ARGUE FOR STRONG U.S.-ISRAELI TIES

We reject the notion of **moral equivalency** that underlies current U.S. policy toward Israel and her Arab enemies. It is as inappro-priate here as American "even-handedness" would have been between Iraq and Kuwait after Saddam's invasion. The target of aggressive designs is not equivalent to the aggressor.

Communism's demise should teach us that a moral compass is one of the most important, practical tools of U.S. foreign policy. American support for freedom, democracy and Western values over totalitarianism, tyranny and anti-Western ideologies should be the rule for U.S. policy, including in the Middle East. As friendly as the United States is with many Arab states, when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the United States must be squarely on the side of the Israelis.

Commitment to the right of the Jewish people to a state in their ancient homeland – support for Zionism as the legitimate Jewish national liberation movement – has been American policy since World War I. While Arab powers have always rejected this view – opposing it through rioting, terrorism, war and diplomacy – the United States has always opposed their rejectionism. It should continue to do so today, and not deal "even-handedly" between Israel and its enemies.

FOCUS ON MAXIMIZING ISRAEL'S SECURITY – NOT TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS

There can be *true* peace — as opposed to a simple balance of forces —only if neither side to the conflict intends harm to the other. This would require Arab rejectionists to change their minds fundamentally with regard to the right of the Jews to a state in Palestine. Undoubtedly, there are individual Arabs willing to make peace with Israel; unfortunately, they are not in charge in the Arab states and groups with whom Israel is now being asked to negotiate. Israel cannot simply assume that its long-time, bitter enemies have had a change of heart under present circumstances, when there is so much evidence to the contrary and when the costs of being wrong may be fatal to the Jewish State. No American leader should subject Israel to untoward security risks.

Hence the proper aim of the current negotiations should be establishing whether the Arab powers intend peace and, if so, what they can do to *demonstrate* their intent. This means not just issuing set-piece invocations involving the word "peace" and demands for militarily significant territorial concessions from Israel. To be constructive, the current talks should focus on the essence of the conflict: recognition of Israel's legitimacy – *not* on undermining Israel's security. Were Arab governments to concentrate on shoring up Israel's legitimacy with their publics, abandoning policies of belligerency and ceasing (at least for the time being) to press territorial demands that would increase Israel's military vulnerability, they would maximize the chances for peace. In this regard, American officials should not make the dangerous error of underestimating Israel's view of the strategic importance of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights under present and foreseeable circumstances. It puts wholly unwarranted faith in international law to expect that arms control agreements within peace treaties can ensure that these territories would continue to serve their defensive purposes if Israel were to relinquish control to another state.

What ultimately happens to the sovereignty over these disputed territories *once there is a well-established, secure and workable peace* is a matter the parties should sort out among themselves.**It should not now be a preoccupation of the United States.** Until then, moreover, America should not engage in pressure diplomacy against Israel that may bring on the war we are hoping to prevent. This applies in particular to efforts to foist on Israel territorial concessions that would, if accepted by the Israelis, create *de facto* – if not *de jure* – American security obligations that we are simply in no position to fulfill. It would be unwise for the United States to take a country (Israel) now in a position to defend itself and even to help us in certain regional contingencies and turn it into a state that relies on U.S. forces for its defense, something Israel has strenuously and properly resisted.

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spending much of their time among people of their own race. The persistence of segregation—residential and social—draws a sharp dividing line between blacks and whites of all classes. In consequence, black intellectual styles remain more discursive than linear, which can be a drawback when facing a multiple-choice format. Indeed, one of the early arguments for integration was that in mixed classes, black students would learn "white" modes of interpretation and analysis, thus eroding the SAT gap. Yet white scores have been on the decline for at least twenty years, so whites may not be the best model.

Whites have been hurt by affirmative action. Whether affirmative action involves "quotas" or "goals," in practice it means exempting some people from customary requirements and qualifications. In fact, such policies have been around for a long time. For example, colleges occasionally decide to admit some students from Montana, to ensure a diverse entering class. Even if their grades aren't very good, coming from a distant state is seen as a compensatory credential. And to make room for them, abler applicants from other states end up being turned down. Today affirmative action aims at raising black ratios in education and employment. As with coming from Montana, being black becomes a credential.

No one can say with certainty how many white Americans have been bypassed or displaced because of preferential policies. Alan Bakke sued a University of California medical school because he believed that a place he deserved had gone to a minority applicant. He obviously felt injured. But if his record was creditable, he would probably have been admitted to some other schools, which should have cushioned the blow. With this caveat in mind, we can try to gauge how far affirmative action has been edging out whites.

At last count, ten top-rated schools—Amherst, Brown, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard, MIT, Northwestern, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale—had a total of 9,555 black, Hispanic, and Native American students out of an overall 107,409 enrollment. Unfortunately, colleges do not report academic records for subgroups. So for present purposes, using nationwide SAT figures, I will assume that three-fifths of the minority students accepted had records that were inferior to those of other applicants who were turned away. Three-fifths of 9,555 works out to 5,733 unadmitted whites and Asians, who had to settle for lesser schools. (Had these colleges imposed their customary criteria, their aggregate minority ratio would have stood at 3.6 percent, rather than the 8.9 percent they attained through affirmative action.) Still, 101,676 whites and Asians *were* admitted, a fairly hefty number. And in many if not most cases, those rejected simply traded down within the Top Ten. It's also worth considering that not all admitted whites are potential Phi Beta Kappas. In addition to Montana residents, even the Iviest schools bend rules for alumni offspring, and even Harvard has been known to favor football players.

White displacement in employment is less easy to compute, since hirings and promotions are more apt to involve intangible judgments. Still, figures for occupations yield some answers. In most professional, white-collar, and craft fields, recent years have seen an increased bloc of blacks; and affirmative action has undoubtedly played some role. There is much talk about whites who feel they are being bypassed, with not a few filing lawsuits. In the academic world, white men seeking instructorships have good reason to believe that their résumés will be relegated to the bottom of the pile. After all, it is hard to find a department that has not given high priority to recruiting a black colleague.

The blue-collar world has young men who aspire to careers as police officers or fire fighters, often to carry on a long family tradition. Although not usually studious, they cram hard for the tests; but those who pass at the margin see appointments going to blacks with lower scores.

But how typical are stories like these? The Census and Bureau of Labor Statistics collate figures on racial distributions within various occupations. As the accompanying table shows, despite all the efforts of medical schools and college faculties, the black proportions of physicians and professors have barely budged over twenty years.

BLACK REPRESENTATION IN OCCUPATIONS

	1970	*1990*	*Share of New Jobs*
Physicians	2.2%	3.0%	3.8%
Lawyers	1.3%	3.2%	4.3%
College Professors	3.5%	4.5%	6.3%
Electricians	3.0%	6.2%	12.7%
Bank Tellers	4.3%	9.9%	16.3%
Bus Drivers	14.3%	24.4%	33.8%
Police Officers	6.3%	13.5%	41.1%
Total Work Force	9.6%	10.1%	11.0%

Indeed, blacks filled only 6.3 percent of the new faculty positions created between 1970 and 1990. So if white men haven't gotten posts, it wasn't due to extensive black hiring, but rather to a preference for women, who received more than half of the new academic openings. Among doctors and lawyers, black gains were even smaller, in part because expansions in both professions brought in even more whites. Nor are all advances by blacks due to preferential policies. There are more black bus drivers and bank tellers; while one reason is that blacks have been upgrading their skills, another may be that fewer whites find they are attracted to those jobs.

Although the percentage of black electricians doubled, it yielded them little more than their overall share of new jobs, so hardly any whites lost out. The real shift was in police selection, where blacks received more than 40 percent of the 100,000 new posts in law

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enforcement. Here, clearly, affirmative action has worked against white applicants. Unlike the students rejected by Amherst, who go on to Lehigh, whites who don't make it into the police haven't as consoling a second option. But in the end black Americans remain a relatively small minority, so there are limits to how many whites they can displace even with aggressive affirmative action recruiting. At the college level, the real competition for whites comes from Asians, who are winning places not through preferential policies but on academic merit.

Overall, persons with racial identities—black and white Americans—constitute a declining portion of the population. Since 1970 individuals of European ancestry, or Caucasoid stock, have declined from 83.3 percent to 75.3 percent of the national total. And during these decades, Americans of African ancestry, or the Negroid race, rose by only one percentage point—from 10.9 to 11.9 percent—and that was largely due to new arrivals from the Caribbean. By the next census, it is likely that blacks will have lost out to Hispanics—whose share of the population has more than doubled in the last twenty years—as America's largest minority group. Indeed, this has already happened in twenty states, including Massachusetts, California, and Colorado.

The nation's fastest-growing groups are rejecting racial designations. For example, we hardly ever hear allusions to the "yellow" or "Mongoloid" race, just as "Oriental" has all but disappeared. Chinese and Japanese and Koreans have chosen to emphasize their separate national identities rather than evoke a common heritage. Unfortunately the media have adopted the umbrella term "Asian," which tells us little about those under it, since they could equally well be Afghans or Laotians or Filipinos.

Hispanics are also finding no need for a racial category. This, too, is a recent development. In responding to the 1970 census, fully 98 percent said they wanted to be classified as black or white. In 1990, however, over half shunned those racial options and chose to check "Other." By doing this, they were signaling that their Hispanic identity was all they wanted or needed. Even less than Asians, Hispanics are hardly a race. If anything, Latin America has been the world's leading melting pot, yielding every possible mixture of European and African and indigenous strains. Even Latino lobbyists limit themselves to calling for preserving regional histories, languages, and cultures rather than racial roots.

In the past, also, many persons of indigenous stock would report that they were white, perhaps hoping to gain such benefits as that designation might bring. Recently we have seen displays of pride among these groups, reflected in what they tell the census. Since 1970 persons listing themselves as Native Americans, Hawaiians, Aleuts, or Eskimos have increased by almost 90 percent, which comes to seven times the increase for the nation as a whole. Moreover, these affinities tend to be tribal or regional, rather than racial.

Of course, it could be argued that it doesn't much matter if the "disuniting of America"—Arthur Schlesinger's phrase—is along racial or other lines. Blacks and Puerto Ricans and Aleuts all claim preference under affirmative action; and supposed disadvantages can have varied sources. Still, my own observations have been that Asians and Hispanics and others who want to make it on their own have seen the harm that being "racial" can do. To define oneself as black or white—or to have those origins assigned to you—assigns overwhelming weight to a primordial ancestry. With race can come a genetic determinism, often suggesting higher or lower locations on an evolutionary ladder. Hence the choice of Asians to put their nationalities first, while Hispanics prefer to stress the culture they created and sustain as a matter of choice. They are also aware of the hostilities and tensions dividing blacks and whites, and have chosen not so much a middle ground as seats off to the side.

If the United States becomes less racial, does this mean it will emerge as a more "multiethnic" society? Don't bet on it. The great majority of recent immigrants, like their counterparts in the past, intend to become mainstream Americans. They did not make the trek here to change the rules and regimens of a society in which they want to succeed. Too much heed has been paid to Latino and kindred publicists, who make careers calling for the preservation of what are essentially folktales and folkways. (They get as much attention as they do by playing on white guilt, which regards tribal rites in the same vein as the spotted owl.)

Statistically, the advent of Hispanics and Asians—joined by new immigrants from the Middle East—will spell further white decline. Yet if most of those arriving have no wish to become white, not many see themselves as "people of color." They want their children to get traditional American educations and graduate to assimilated suburbs. As recent books by Linda Chavez and Rosalie Pedalino Porter have shown, Hispanic students tend to be shunted into special classes by self-serving bureaucrats rather than at the behest of their parents. And the families of my immigrant students in Queens regard the borough as a waystation prior to a suburban move. Moreover, once they become middle-class, they will have little or no difficulty entering what were once all-white neighborhoods. (For that reason, they are at pains to dissociate themselves from black Americans; just listen to some of their remarks.) In return, middle-class America is prepared to absorb newcomers who show a willingness to adapt. Even George Bush boasts of his Hispanic daughter-in-law, and she is one of almost 30 percent of Hispanics who marry outside their culture. But that hardly matters, since most people come here to become Americans, and they have a good eye and ear for how and where to adapt. •

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BOOKS & The Arts

Stanley Kauffmann on Films

Forster—Again and Better

A really odd coincidence. In successive weeks, two films made from E. M. Forster novels: last week *Where Angels Fear To Tread*, this week **Howards End** (Orion Classics).

The title is, of course, the name of a country house; the question of who will inherit that house frames the novel (published in 1910). In the beginning, the owner, the ailing Ruth Wilcox, scrawls a penciled note on her deathbed, willing the house to her new friend Margaret Schlegel. After Ruth's death, her husband, Henry, and their (grown) children conspire to suppress that note, to keep the house themselves. At the end, however, Margaret has become the second Mrs. Wilcox, and Henry wills the house to her with the consent of his children.

But this embracing symbol is only an irony of fate, not an irony of social deterioration. Forster is decidedly interested in change and deterioration, but not through Margaret; she does not at all embody the lowering of the English standards represented by Howards End. Forster shows England's future to be somber in other ways. Perhaps the most subtle of these is by the very persons of the Schlegel sisters, Margaret and Helen—German father, English mother, very conscious both of English breeding and German standards—only faintly suspecting (as did the author) the future conflict between their two strains, the war that must also brutalize their sense of what life is for.

The somber English future is further foreshadowed in the Schlegel sisters' involvement with the victimized clerk Leonard Bast and his blowsy wife; and in the way that the sisters' efforts to help the Basts collide with the defensive arrogance of the rich industrialist Henry Wilcox ("The poor are the poor, and one's sorry for them, but there it is"). Change, foreseen yet puzzling, hovers over the whole book. London itself is spreading outward, now almost visible from Howards End. "And London is only part of something else, I'm afraid," says Helen toward the end. "Life's going to be melted down, all over the world."

Ruth Prawer Jhabvala, the screenwriter, and James Ivory, the director, did fairly well a few years ago with their film of Forster's *A Room with a View*. But they have surpassed that work with this lovely adaptation of *Howards End*—despite the fact that Forster's basic method (let alone other matters) could not be caught on film. Forster writes as if his characters have independent lives that frequently or occasionally cross his path, at which times he reports on them. Speaking of Leonard Bast: "He knew that he was poor, and would admit it; he would have died sooner than confess any inferiority to the rich. This may be splendid of him." Now that's a comment by an observer of Leonard, not by his creator. Add Forster's carefully offhand technical dexterity—such as the handling of his (customary) melodramatic climax—and we get an impression of an English gentleman writing a novel as if he were only an amused amateur, who would not have us think that he is a professional, however breathtakingly skilled. The honor of his class is safe in the hands of a master novelist of that class.

All this is impossible to film. Yet Jhabvala has done as well as we can imagine. First, she has seen that there is more consonance between the dialogue and the motion of the story than, for instance, in *Where Angels Fear To Tread*, so that more of Forster gets into the film just by what is spoken. Second, all her cinematic expansions—Leonard's fantasies, the encounter that leads to Helen's pregnancy—are justly done. Lastly, though she knows she couldn't capture every iota of the book's thematic complexity, she replicates Forster's sense of a historical fabric that is being woven with and without the knowledge of the people entangled in it.

In any case, Jhabvala has fashioned a screenplay that is very usable by actors. Thus, for me, she supports the prime reason why this film had to be made—why it would have been a sin *not* to make it—the acting.

First, Ruth Wilcox is played by Vanessa Redgrave. The part is relatively brief—Ruth dies early—but Redgrave once again endows a role with its entire past and present, with its secrets, from the moment she speaks. She portrays perfectly (too cool an adverb) a woman who is dying and who fears that something more important than herself is dying with her.

Second, Margaret is Emma Thompson. She has been seen on screen in only a few roles: Katherine in *Henry V*, a fluttery French aristo in *Impromptu*, and

FILMS WORTH SEEING

Bugsy. *Warren Beatty (pretty strong) and Annette Bening (stronger) play out the doomed romance of Bugsy Siegel and his light o' love in a context of crime and killing. Some 1940s gangster vitality. (Reviewed 12/23&30/91)* **Daughters of the Dust.** *A visual ballad of the movement of Gullah blacks from the Sea Islands to the North in 1902. Julie Dash, writer and director, could have been more concise, but she is quite clearly a true talent. (2/10/92)* **JFK.** *Historically fantastic, Oliver Stone's rendition of the assassination nonetheless touches some deep dread and worry in this country. And it is a bitter, if farfetched, protest against Vietnam. (1/27/92)* **35 Up.** *Every seven years Michael Apted, the English director, shoots film of a group of English people. They were aged 7 when he started, and the end of this fascinating series is not in sight. (2/17/92)* **—SK**

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some bravura stuff in *Dead Again*. In these parts she showed great range, which may not be very important, but she also showed command of styles, which is. This glorious woman gives something more than a fine performance of Margaret. We're tempted to believe that Thompson moves and speaks the way that Margaret moved and spoke in Forster's head as he was bringing her to literary being. To be a great dramatist's collaborator, as Thompson is in *Henry V*, is not easy but is at least in the natural order of things. To be a great novelist's collaborator, as she is here, is to join two arts that are often forced together but are not often truly wed.

Something else grows out of this. In the several scenes between Redgrave and Thompson, we feel an English completeness—two English artists helping English art to a flowering unforeseen by the original artist.

Helena Bonham Carter's Helen is a happy surprise. In last week's film, and elsewhere, Bonham Carter has seemed not much more than an intelligent young woman with a round face and a distinct class stamp. But her Helen is excellently inflected, lithe, impulsive, hot, acute.

Praise for two more of the cast (all of them are better than adequate). Sam West as Leonard Bast fixes poignantly the quandary of the risen prole—his forebears were "agricultural laborers," he says—tormented both by the prison of his clerkly existence and the visions of a fuller life opened to him by some education. West understands that Bast is marked for tragedy simply because he is not back there with his forebears.

Anthony Hopkins is Henry Wilcox, as he ought to be: a man brusque by nature and by design—to cover both his aggressions and his tenderness. Hopkins doesn't have the accent that Wilcox should have (this *is* a film about class), but he has plentiful force and an almost unthinking authority.

Howards End was made by a trio that has been working together for thirty years. Jhabvala is the screenwriting member. The producer is Ismail Merchant. It's hard to specify his contributions to this film, but his record, despite its ups and downs, implies the taste and elegance and ambition that flourish here.

To James Ivory, the director, congratulations first on his work with the actors—especially with Bonham Carter, whom he has sparked to life. As for visual texture, Ivory has had evocative designs from Luciana Arrighi, sumptuous costumes from Jenny Beavan and John Bright, exact yet empathic camerawork from Tony Pierce-Roberts. By now it isn't rare for period pictures to look inhabited and real, but Ivory has treated this texture as casually as Forster (in his way) does, simply relying on it to be there as he concentrates on his people. Few will ever hail Ivory as a director of unmistakable style, but he has done the next best thing: he has become good enough to be almost invisible.

Ivory knows, we can assume, better than any of us that his film is not the novel. But he has made it move to the music of the novel. The novel is on our shelves; the film is on our screens, a different organism complete in itself; and its completeness is just where it ought to be—not in mere fidelity to plot but in the physical embodiment of character and world. •

The Scowl of Minerva

BY STEPHEN HOLMES

The End of History and the Last Man by Francis Fukuyama

(Free Press, 418 pp., $24.95)

I.

The collapse of communism has brought dizziness and disorientation across the political spectrum. For the barbarians, as the poet Cavafy wrote, were a kind of solution. But no longer: the East-West confrontation has lost its power to threaten and to clarify our lives. Even the distinction between left and right, which has underlain all European politics since 1789, has been shaken. Throughout the post-Communist world, from the Baltics to Albania, and now in Russia itself, we are observing waves of radical change that look so far like a *liberal* revolution. The strangeness of the notion suggests the unprecedentedness of the change. But how else to describe the ground-up reorganizations occurring, with varying degrees of haste and success, across the post-Leninist world? Is liberal revolution not the most significant fact of contemporary political life?

An immense task of reconceptualization lies before us. Scholars and politicians alike are wondering how to bring this complex and novel world into focus, how to comprehend its new powers for good and ill. A first avalanche of answers to these questions came cascading into print two years ago. The man who threw the stone that loosed the avalanche was Francis Fukuyama: his essay "The End of History?" appeared in 1989 in *The National Interest*, and the colloquium of rejoinders organized by the journal was only the beginning of a worldwide outpouring of reactions.

Most of these responses, as Fukuyama has boasted, were negative, if not jeering. They also had real force. History is unpredictable, so why speak of its end? Why describe a movement from the frozen to the fluid, from riveted bipolarism to unsettled multipolarism, in these eschatological terms? What has died is not history but Marxism, and Marxism was precisely an eschatological philosophy that distorted history by forcing it into a procrustean scheme with a predetermined direction and a happy end. But Fukuyama was unmoved by these early animadversions, and now he invites the world to stir for a second time. His book appears not only to answer his many critics, but also to amplify and to enlarge his account of politics and history. This time around he will "[take] into account the experience of all peoples in all times."

Though he might not admit it, Fukuyama has accepted many of the criticisms leveled against him and incorporated them into his narrative, sometimes suavely, in the main text, at other times clumsily, in the footnotes. But still he sticks obstinately to his original claim. His stubbornness does not appear to be based on a need for recognition (a need that figures prominently in his new analysis of human affairs) or reputation. He seems sincerely to believe that in some sense all the "major problems" in world history have now been solved. We are facing, he says, "the end of all large disputes"; we are on the threshold of "a world where struggle over all of the large issues has been largely settled."

Fukuyama sees a new agreement in world politics, "a remarkable consensus concerning the legitimacy of liberal democracy." In 1932 or 1942, liberal democracy was besieged by ideological enemies on the right and the left. Many Western intellectuals heard the siren

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

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songs of fascism or communism; disagreement raged about the direction in which contemporary societies should move. In 1992, however, these old controversies have vanished. The two great totalitarian temptations of the twentieth century have gone down, one with a bang, the other with a whimper. And so a quietus has descended on history's long storm. "Everyone" now recognizes that the ideal of liberal democracy cannot be improved upon. It is worshiped even in those underdeveloped countries where the possibility of putting it into practice seems remote. To be sure, debates continue about the extent of government regulation or the size of the public sector within advanced liberal states, but the differences between liberal regulators and liberal marketeers pale against the background of their underlying agreement. All parties now accept private property, economic competition, juridical equality, the separation of powers, competitive elections, freedom of the press, religious toleration, and so on.

This new consensus spells the termination of ideological debate (or, to coin a phrase, the end of ideology). That is the phenomenon that Fukuyama wants to capture with his metaphor—if it is a metaphor—about history's culmination. Obviously he has a point. But how much of a point? And is this the most precise and the most intellectually responsible way to make it? If Fukuyama were simply registering a narrowing of ideological differences among secular Western elites, or the recent collapse of long-standing tyrannical regimes, he would be on fairly safe ground. But he is grander. The collapse of our major rival for the past forty-five years, he claims, tells us something essential about nothing less than the overall course of world history—about "a broader historical process leading to the spread of liberal democracy around the world."

In some places Fukuyama sets forth his chronicle of the human story with the authority of a mastermind holding the key to the universe; in other places he offers it tentatively, as a *façon de parler*, as a hypothesis, worth considering, maybe. In any case, his description of "the historical process" conflates many different claims. Here, world history is described as coherent or intelligible; there, it is called irreversible. Here, history is cumulative (all past achievements are retained); there, history is directional (headed toward perpetual peace or the convergence of political and economic systems). And everywhere history is described as meaningful and having a plot, as beginning with a problem that, after much travail, it solves. The sheepish version of this thesis is that secular Western intellectuals now agree that history has a goal. The knock-'em-down version is that the world, or some of it, already has arrived at this goal.

All these claims are jumbled together, though they are analytically quite distinct. (History can disclose irreversibilities without containing any meaning and without having any overarching goal.) By slipping around among different conceptions of historical change, however, Fukuyama achieves a tactical advantage: he presents his critic with a moving target. Consider his double-talk about progress. In some passages, he claims that the overarching pattern has no moral content: history marches on, but it may well make things worse instead of better. This is a defensible view. But it is a view that flies in the face of Fukuyama's own thinking; for if history is not a process of improvement, then he cannot define the end of history as the end of improvement, which he repeatedly does.

In transcribing into his book many of the best arguments made against his original essay, Fukuyama walks into other contradictions as well. He now admits that history is unpredictable: "some new authoritarian alternatives, perhaps never before seen in history, may assert themselves in the future." And he says that old tyrannies may return: "We have no guarantee and cannot assure future generations that there will be no future Hitlers." Moreover, "we can expect a higher degree of nationalist conflict in Europe with the end of the cold war." And cultural wars are just about to begin: if, in one mood, perpetual peace is supposed to come about thanks to "an increasing homogenization of all human societies, regardless of their historical origins or cultural inheritances," in another mood "persistent cultural differences between ostensibly liberal democratic capitalist states will prove much harder to eradicate."

Fukuyama does not seem to understand that all these pre-emptive concessions amount to an admission of defeat. Indeed, the most important sentence in his book is this one: "No regime—no 'socioeconomic system'—is able to satisfy all men in all places." With this fine observation, however, he stands himself on his own head. He flatly, and rightly, contradicts the idea of an end of history: if liberal democracy, too, is unsatisfying, then it, too, cannot represent the climax.

And the sentence illustrates something else, perhaps the most profound of Fukuyama's divisions against himself.

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Switching from cheerleading to doomsaying, he laments "the banalization of life through modern consumerism." Fukuyama begins as an anti-Jeremiah, announcing that "good news has come" and urging us "to shake off our acquired pessimism," and ends up as just another Jeremiah, denouncing "some kind of internal rot" at the heart of the West. In short, he celebrates and deplores the West in the same breath: that is the real plot of his book. (When he wants to explain how unsatisfying liberal democracy is, he calls it "bourgeois society.") He is an optimist and a pessimist, without worrying the logical and moral contradictions. He praises the Soviet debacle and damns our alleged degeneration; he waves a flag of victory and hangs his head in despair. His strong cultural pessimism is reflected in the second half of his title, "the last man," a phrase borrowed from Nietzsche: the inhabitants of Western-style liberal democracies are last men, emptied of ambition, satisfied with mediocrity, bereft of high ideals, unwilling to make sacrifices.

Fukuyama's argument rests on three fundamental and closely related premises that have been characteristic of a particular variety of conservatism. First, the battle against communism is the heart and soul of world history. Second, Western liberal democracies are vulgar and corrupt and rotten. (We won the cold war because of the inner weaknesses of Communist states, not because of any great strength of our own.) Third, the only thing that prevented corrupt liberal states from sinking to the ultimate depravity was the moral struggle against communism. Our final victory, therefore, is our final defeat. Having vanquished communism, we have nothing to fight for except security, wealth, and comfort—but those are not ideal values, they are materialist temptations. Thus history after the struggle will be flat and without interest. Indeed, there will be no history worthy of the name.

But it is obvious, or it should have been obvious, that communism was neither our only important problem nor our only ideological enemy (how some conservatives will miss it!). To the forms of antiliberalism that exist today, others will surely be added in the future, due to human ingenuity and human evil. It should also be obvious that liberal democracy is flawed but not rotten. Despite its shortcomings, liberal democracy has enormous internal strengths, and will remain a fairly stable political and economic system, offering much to different people across the globe without

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

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

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draining their lives of moral meaning.

Fukuyama borrows his idea of the end of history from Alexander Kojève, the Russian émigré philosopher and cult figure who taught an influential seminar on Hegel in Paris in the 1930s. (Among the many things Fukuyama undermines is his own admiration for Kojève: my favorite understatement in this overstated book is his admission, which is hidden in the footnotes, that "there are certain problems in seeing Kojève himself as a liberal, insofar as he frequently professed an ardent admiration for Stalin and asserted that there was no essential difference between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China of the 1950s.") Kojève's thesis was that the pivot point of world history was the transition from separate class societies to a single classless society encompassing the whole of mankind, that hierarchical and particularistic societies have gradually given way (or are gradually giving way) to "the victory of the universal and homogeneous state." The transition from aristocracy to egalitarianism was simultaneously a revaluation of values and an abandonment of violence and war for perpetual peace. Citing Hegel, Kojève asserted that this Great Transition became inevitable in 1806, when Napoleon (or more generally the force that Kojève called "Robespierre-Napoleon") defeated the Prussian army and prepared the way for the spread of Enlightenment ideas throughout the world.

As a moment's reflection makes clear, however, the transition from a class society to classlessness, or from pre-Enlightenment ideals to Enlightenment ideals, has nothing to do with the end of the cold war. Intellectually, the cold war was an internecine conflict, a battle between two Enlightenment ideologies. The end of that intellectual and political struggle certainly does not signal the defeat of the premodern by the modern. Kojève was concerned with the victory of an egalitarian ideology over its inegalitarian rival; but the occasion for Fukuyama's speculation is the victory of one egalitarian ideology over another. This difference is fundamental, yet it is never mentioned.

It is true that Communists and liberals give contrary answers to a whole range of important questions (Does the march of History guarantee the triumph of justice? How great a threat to freedom is posed by state power? What are the consequences of private property for the worst-off members of society?). It is also true that the schismatic war within the Enlightenment is done. But for all their differences, liberalism and communism share egalitarian and cosmopolitan presuppositions. Both favor in principle the emancipation of the individual and the development of his potential. Both are secular. (Communists wish to eradicate religion, liberals to depoliticize it.) Both admire technical advance and economic growth. (They even cooperated in the great struggle against fascism, which was the real revolt against modernity.) Like all family quarrels, their confrontation was especially intense, but it is now ended, and it can be asserted with some confidence that the antiliberalism of the future will not be Marxist, or in any way a child of the Enlightenment. But does even this extraordinary development amount to the end of "large issues" and ideological conflict? I doubt it.

How can Fukuyama claim that the battle between liberalism and non-Communist forms of authoritarianism is not ideological in the customary sense? (He also claims the opposite, but let's ignore the inconsistency this time.) Are not ideas clearly at stake in these other confrontations? Is it really correct to say that the end of the cold war means the replacement of ideological conflict by ethnic conflict? Will the battle of grand universalism against grand universalism really be replaced by the battle of petty particularism against petty particularism? Or to put it differently, are not particularisms also informed by grand and dangerous ideas?

Religion and nationalism are rising, not falling, and they often take the form of ideological beliefs that prefer History to history. And what the West stands for in its struggle against, say, Islamic fundamentalism or Baathist dictatorship are precisely the central values and institutions of liberalism: individual freedom, tolerance for diversity, rights of minorities, impartiality of the law, government by consent, competitive elections, freedom of the press, wide-open public debate, and so on. So why should confrontation with a form of authoritarianism that has been culturally untouched by the Enlightenment be less ideological than confrontation with a bastard child of the Enlightenment itself? Why should the coercive imposition of a public conception of virtue on all citizens be any less ideologically repulsive to liberals simply because it is ethnocratic or theocratic rather than egalitarian?

Fukuyama is a fierce critic of cultural relativism, but he is oddly a cultural relativist on this point. He thinks that the West has every reason to impose its own political norms on Eastern Europe and Russia, but not on East Asia or the Muslim world, because we inhabit a different cultural space or tradition. Multiparty democracy cannot be exported to Japan, for example, because Japanese culture abhors wide-open public debate in the liberal manner:

> There are several respects in which one could say that Japan is governed by a benevolent one-party dictatorship, not because that party has imposed itself upon society in the manner of the Soviet Communist Party, but because the people of Japan *choose* to be ruled in that fashion. The current Japanese system of government reflects a broad social consensus rooted in Japan's group-oriented culture that would feel profoundly uncomfortable with more "open" contestation or the alternation of parties in power.

Because of Asia's Confucian traditions, in other words, the Japanese voter is grateful to have no real choice on election day. Autocratic rulers in Europe, of course, always invoked their society's low tolerance for disagreement as a fundamental justification for their monopoly on power. The LDP does the same in Japan today. But it is a little shocking to find Fukuyama furnishing those places in the world where history did not end with a historical excuse.

II.

Fukuyama is not content with merely describing the pattern of history. That is the work of mere historians. He wants to explain history, to show why it *necessarily* moves in the direction he detects. His explanation fails, but it is interesting. There are two basic motors, he says, that drive the historical process: science, or the rational domination of nature, and pride, or the demand for social recognition.

Fukuyama calls modern science "the Mechanism that gives history its directionality." The ancient conception of history as a repetitive cycle has been retired by the relentless and irreversible advance of science. Once unleashed, its power is unstoppable: technology, the major outgrowth of the scientific worldview, has swept the world. And science—here is the rub—"in some way makes capitalism inevitable." The argument is admittedly and a little amusingly Marxist: the forces of production develop according to a logic of their own, and at a certain point the old relations of production become a fetter on the further use and development of technology, and then the old social system crumbles and is replaced by a new one. Applying this deterministic scheme to 1989, Fukuyama reasons that the Stalinist system, while perfectly compatible with industrialization, became a shackle on the development of computer technology: when the

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microchip was ripe, the Communist system went down.

Technical rationality does not, however, guarantee the triumph of political democracy. Science may flourish in an atmosphere of freedom, but neo-Confucian authoritarianism, not democratic individualism, is the best system for exploiting the forces unleashed by science and technology. Unlike the free-wheeling, individualistic, and consumption-oriented societies of the West, the tradition-bound culture of Japan promotes pride in one's work and group loyalty, which are the optimal conditions for uncorking the potential of modern technology and a rational division of labor.

If we think only of economic development, therefore, the end of history lies not with "unimprovable" individualistic democracy but with "market-oriented authoritarianism" on the Asian model. The obvious implication is that, if science alone moved history, then the future would belong to group-think. So what accounts for the supremacy of liberal democracy? Enter the second major force in Fukuyama's Universal History: human pride, or the desire for recognition.

Democratic politics—as opposed to mere market capitalism—becomes inevitable because of this yearning deeply planted in the human soul. As Hegel explained, man desires more than food, shelter, sex, and sleep: "He desires the desire of other men, that is, to be wanted by others or to be *recognized*." Most of life is dominated by this non-materialistic need for respect. The end of history has arrived, in Western liberal democracies, because man has found here what he has been seeking from the beginning of time: recognition.

Fukuyama means this aspect of his analysis to be a protest against the reductionist picture of human motivation characteristic of neoclassical economics. Departing from his usual praise of "cumulative" scientific advance, he laments "the successful 'economization' of our thinking that has occurred in the past 400 years." Economics, having forgotten Plato's wisdom about irrational passions, has made much of human behavior unintelligible. For if man were an economic animal (or a rational pursuer of material advantage) he would never, as he sometimes does, throw away his life in pursuit of something so utterly useless as an enemy flag. To understand the course of human history, we need to grasp such non-economic motives as pride, ambition, indignation, and anger.

Fukuyama's intentions here are admirable. But it is not enough merely to assert the existence of non-material motives and non-calculating styles of action. There are important distinctions among the many non-materialist and non-economic motives, that is, among the passions, which Fukuyama fails to make. He does not even distinguish between material and non-material goals, on the one hand, and calculating and non-calculating styles of behavior, on the other. But this is an essential distinction, since we can easily pursue non-material goals in a perfectly rational and calculating manner.

At first Fukuyama draws a sharp contrast between the rational desire for economic prosperity and the prerational desire for the recognition of others. He uses the Greek word *thymos* or "spiritedness," from Plato's *Republic*, to stand for this second desire. Thus, he argues that "the self-assertion arising from *thymos* and the selfishness of desire are very distinct phenomena." But while he asserts that they are "very distinct," he also says that they are one and the same. In fact, capitalism is a product not of material self-interest, but of pride: "The wants created by modern consumerism arise, in other words, from man's vanity." *Thymos* is not repressed in economic life, it is merely demilitarized. Fine; but this claim is repeatedly contradicted by Fukuyama's assertion that *thymos* is wholly eliminated in economic man.

Many of Fukuyama's problems stem from his decision to elide the Platonic idea of *thymos* with the Hegelian idea of recognition. There are some interesting parallels, but the two concepts are not so easily conflated as Fukuyama assumes. And other muddles result from fusing Hegel's historicism with Plato's antihistoricism. Sometimes Fukuyama claims that *thymos* is a permanent feature of the human mind. At other times he claims that it can be extinguished, and perhaps has been extinguished, in bourgeois societies. Sometimes he says that *thymos* is an unsatisfiable desire. At other times he says that it can be satisfied, and perhaps has been satisfied, in bourgeois societies.

Fukuyama's complaint that the economist's idea of "utility" has no explanatory value because it is used tautologically to "encompass any end actually pursued by human beings" may be appropriately directed at his own notion of *thymos*. This desire for recognition is "the origin of tyranny, imperialism, and the desire to dominate" as well as "the psychological ground for political virtues like courage, public-spiritedness,


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

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and justice." It explains anger and pity, duty and disobedience, religious piety and aggressive ultranationalism, pride in one's work and shame at one's looks, extreme self-confidence and its total lack. It is the source of eccentricity as well as conformism, fierce individualism as well as subordination to the group. It is the passion that engenders affection for a heroic leader as well as contempt for pitiful weaklings. It produces the striving for excellence and the acceptance of one's wormlike nullity.

It never occurs to Fukuyama that a concept that may explain so much might not explain anything at all. He should have distinguished more carefully among the passions, and more generally among passions, interests, and norms. Instead, he adheres confusingly to a crude opposition between the economistic and the non-economistic, employing the general category of non-materialistic motivation to cover both moral ideas and irrational impulses. But surely norms and passions—say, the idea of justice and the feeling of envy—should be kept distinct. Similarly, Fukuyama fails to distinguish between the man who risks his life "for the sake of higher, abstract principles and goals" and the man who does so "for the sole purpose of demonstrating that he has contempt for his own life." But attachment to moral norms is quite different from existential daredevilry. (Fukuyama does not worry about the relationship between irrational impulses and the higher ends of life.) And both of these motives are distinct from the impulse to prove one's superiority to another human being at risk of life and limb.

If democratic governments are everywhere replacing non-democratic ones, argues Fukuyama, it is because only democracy provides citizens with recognition from their government. Only democracy allows people to escape the humiliating status of dependency and to achieve the self-respect of autonomous adults. Fukuyama's presentation of this central point is vague. Did communism collapse because it was a fetter on the forces of production or because it failed to provide the moral recognition that individuals need and seek? (He sometimes advances the materialist claim, sometimes the non-materialist one.) And surely the desire for recognition does not necessitate the total victory of democracy: socialism may hurt human pride, but it may also gratify human envy. Moreover, there are many kinds of recognition. Some are liberal, some are not liberal. Fukuyama himself argues that Japanese culture offers workers recognition as team players, a highly stable kind of recognition that differs from the individualistic recognition granted in the West.

III.

Fukuyama first announces that liberal democracy satisfies every important longing in the human soul, and then explains that liberal democracy does not satisfy the most vital longing of all, which is *thymos*. The reason for that failure lies in the nature of *thymos*: it contains two contradictory drives—a desire for equal recognition and a desire for unequal recognition. In opposing the desire to be recognized as a superior with the desire to be recognized as an equal, Fukuyama draws a distinction that introduces a fundamental confusion into the meta-narrative he borrows from Kojève.

Following Kojève's analysis of the transition from aristocratic to egalitarian societies, Fukuyama describes the shift from "inherently unequal recognition" to "universal and reciprocal recognition" as a logical necessity. The desire for recognition-as-a-superior is irrational or internally incoherent, because who wants to be recognized by underlings and nobodies? Recognition as an equal by equals, by contrast, is wholly satisfying and wholly rational. This is an excellent point, although Fukuyama does not seem to appreciate its force as a democratic response to Nietzsche's aristocratic ideal.

Alexander Kojève was an egalitarian and a universalist. Fukuyama, finally, is not. The reason is that Leo Strauss (whose student, Allan Bloom, was Fukuyama's teacher) was not. Strauss was opposed to egalitarian ethics, as well as to any cosmopolitan weakening of national borders. Fukuyama, you might say, is stretched to the breaking point between Kojève and Strauss. For his larger argument, this is the most fatal tension of all.

Following Strauss, and in opposition to Kojève, Fukuyama expresses his deep and rather disturbing disapproval of "liberal democracy's tendency to grant equal recognition to unequal people." Treating unequals as equals is not at all rational, whatever Kojève may have claimed; and Strauss, convinced of the baseness of equality, opposed Kojève on these grounds. Fukuyama adopts this pose, emphasizing "the inherent contradictions in the concept of universal recognition." And he adopts the Straussian strategy of disguising his opposition to the norm of equality as outrage at "moral relativism." But then he also seems to take over Kojève's sincerely egalitarian position. Fukuyama-the-Kojèvian stresses the way universal education (a key feature of economic modernization) encourages people to demand recognition as moral beings. Fukuyama-the-Straussian despises this demand, declaring it an irrational request for the equal recognition of unequals.

Fukuyama presents himself at times as a cosmopolitan, like Kojève, adducing the European Community as a symbol for the borderless liberal world of the future. But he also appears as an anti-cosmopolitan, like Strauss, pointing out the political necessity of morally unjustifiable borders. He repeats the Jekyll-and-Hyde routine when discussing war. (What has been the main cause of war throughout all of human history? Why, *thymos*, of course.) In some passages, Fukuyama celebrates the end of inhuman and wasteful war. In others, he deplores pacification as a moral disaster, since armed confrontationalism tightens sinews and gives meaning to life.

In any case, warfare, too, has now become a thing of the past, because bourgeoisification has cooled man's original hot-bloodedness; the addiction to security and comfort accounts for "the fundamentally un-warlike character of liberal societies." It also explains why the planet is headed inevitably for perpetual peace. Why is deterrence no longer necessary in Western Europe? Why has the "realist" logic of power politics been suspended in the posthistorical zone? "Because most European states understand each other too well. They know that their neighbors are too self-indulgent and consumerist to risk death." Remember, our happy present moment is owed less to the strength of freedom than to the weakness of tyranny: liberal societies are weak-kneed appeasers. (This is contradicted by the history of wars between liberal states and nonliberal states, but never mind.) We are entering a world of sissy states, which will be a world of perpetual peace.

But all this is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of social life in a liberal order. In such an order, it must be recalled, not every complication is a contradiction. The existence of contrary urges, the coexistence of egalitarian impulses and anti-egalitarian impulses, the appetite for security and the desire for dignity, do not necessarily spell tragedy, or even instability, because a liberal society may be complex enough to admit both equalities and inequalities.

The typical pattern in liberal society is a combination of public equality and private inequality. Just as liberalism encourages self-assertion without violence, so it

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encourages private and domesticated attempts to prove one's superiority so long as no coercive authority over others is the consequence. Seen this way, liberal democracy does not look eschatological. It is merely stable, and more fair. It satisfies both pride and envy. It allows individuals to be both equal and unequal. And this particular arrangement, for all its failure to satisfy those who hunger for an end, seems to be just about as admirable and as durable as any imperfect and rickety creation of human beings can hope to be.

The melancholy truth about Fukuyama is that in the end he fails to appreciate the higher values protected by liberal society. Quite the contrary. He asserts that the battle to throw off Communist tyranny was much more fulfilling than the life that will be achieved once liberal democracy is reliably installed in the ex-Communist states. The Chinese students "who stood up to tanks," the Romanian revolutionaries who battled Ceausescu's Securitate, the Lithuanians who fought the Russian black berets, the Russians around Yeltsin's White House: they enjoyed a high that is not available to the inhabitants of normal bourgeois societies. When bravely confronting their armed oppressors, they "were the most free and therefore the most human of beings." But what have they achieved? Not much. They may get VCRs and even passports, but their life will be void of drama and significance. In fact, their hard-won liberation totally destroys "the possibility of their ever again being as free and as human as in their revolutionary struggle."

In sum: becoming free is everything, being free is nothing. How can Fukuyama preach such a message to the millions of men and women still groaning under the bitter legacy of decades of totalitarian rule? Welcome, he tells them, you have just been released from Communist unhappiness into democratic meaninglessness. Welcome to the vacuum at the heart of liberal society, where life is no longer worth living. You are no longer admirable prisoners. You are now contemptible last men.

"Human life," Fukuyama observes from some point very high above human life, "involves a curious paradox: it seems to require injustice, for the struggle against injustice is what calls forth what is highest in man." How should we respond to this sagacity? We might advise Fukuyama, for a start, to have a look at the world around him. It contains ample pain and evil. It confronts human beings with multiple inner and outer struggles. Some are even ideological. Fukuyama may be right, of course, that Communist totalitarianism became a perverse crutch for some Western conservatives, but surely a respect for the all-too-real sufferings of those who lived for decades under that colossal lie rules out anything resembling nostalgia for it. As for Fukuyama's "deeper" suggestion that we need tyranny and war and struggle to make our lives worth living, that peace will bring emptiness and a collapse of meaning, suffice it to say that, whether or not history has ended, there is more to living humanly than living historically.

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When Gush Comes to Shove

BY MOSHE HALBERTAL

The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right by Ehud Sprinzak

(Oxford University Press, 392 pp., $29.95)

In June 1973 Gush Emunim, the religious movement of the Israeli right, attempted to settle in the middle of "Samaria," the northern part of the West Bank. The Labor government opposed the settlement, since it conflicted with its policy not to settle in the middle of heavily populated Palestinian areas. (It approved of settlements in the Jordan Valley in order to transform the Jordan River into the permanent border of Israel.) Despite army blockades of the area, the Gush's settlers managed to move in, and called on their fellow Israeli citizens to join them in resisting forced evacuation. The assumption of the settlers was that no Israeli government would evacuate Jews by force from land that they perceived to be historically Jewish land. Their leadership counted on the hidden sympathy of some government ministers for their pioneering ideals. Indeed, the young religious settlers put a few Labor ministers in mind of their own youth, when they were brash kibbutzniks defying the British and trying to establish a Jewish state. As Ehud Sprinzak writes in his timely and impressive book, "This was after all the historical pattern of Pioneering Zionism: an illicit minority action followed by majority recognition and gratitude."

These assumptions proved themselves to be right. The Labor government showed tremendous hesitation in its dealings with Gush Emunim, and the Gush settlers were treated like colorful, naughty, and idealistic youth rather than as what they really were: an energetic political movement with drastic methods and objectives that was beginning to impose on the government and the state a de facto annexation of the West Bank. A compromise was reached with the settlers in 1973 that allowed them to stay in a nearby location, and that compromise marked the beginning of a turning point, of the swift and steady penetration of Jewish settlements into heavily populated Arab areas—the beginning of the creation of certain fateful and irreversible facts.

At the time I was studying in a yeshiva high school of Bnei Akiba, the youth movement of religious Zionism. The new pioneering perfectly suited our adolescence. It seemed like a legitimate form of rebellion, even a heroic form of rebellion, against the ossified and nostalgic elders who ruled the state and the society. And so most of my friends in Bnei Akiba joined Gush Emunim.

They had another, less obvious reason for joining. With its messianism and its religious radicalism, Gush Emunim was a way for these young people to overcome a deep and double inferiority complex, about both the secular Zionists and the believers who rejected Zionism. The ultraorthodox accused religious Zionists of a lack of religious authenticity, of a spiritual spinelessness, since they had not stood firm against the temptations of a secular political movement that wished to define Jewishness on the modern basis of national identity rather than on the traditional basis of Jewish law. From the other side, the secular Zionists, who led the effort to establish and to protect Israel, insisted that the contribution of religious Zionists had been minor and marginal. The religious Zionist party in the Knesset, the National Religious Party or NRP, offered no psychologically satisfying solution: before 1967 it shared the moderate politics of Israel's labor move-

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ment, and it was therefore perceived as a comfortable satellite to mainstream secular Zionism.

Gush Emunim, however, offered religious Zionists a way out. By joining the settlement movement in the West Bank, young Israelis in yarmulkes could claim to have become the heirs of the founders and a decisive force in national politics—to have usurped the pioneering role that was, before the establishment of the state, largely in the hands of the secular Zionists. And Gush Emunim offered an answer to the guilt aroused by the criticism of the ultraorthodox: here was a new form of religious radicalism, drenched in ancient biblical and modern mystical texts, which demanded dedication and sacrifice, and which was animated not by the rejection of Zionism but by the intensification of its spiritual dimensions.

And so a large number of young, believing Israelis were transformed. As part of this transformation, many students of my yeshiva planned to leave school for a couple of weeks and join the settlers' struggle against the government. When the head of the yeshiva heard of such plans, however, he assembled all the students in the hall of study and bluntly spoke his mind. Politically and spiritually, he opposed the fever that was sweeping his institution. He was an old-style religious Zionist who disliked Gush Emunim, and a teacher who believed that a yeshiva is a place for the study of Talmud and not a place for political action. I remember that he said two things: first, that those students who went to Samaria would be thrown out of school, and second, that those who joined the settlers and defied the law of the state will end up killing innocent people.

The first warning was taken seriously. (Discipline at this yeshiva was never a laughing matter.) The second warning sounded at the time like a rhetorical exaggeration, of the sort that was familiar from a tradition of moralistic preaching. Eleven years later, however, in 1984, a Jewish "underground" on the West Bank was discovered. By the time it was stopped, its members had already killed three Palestinian students in an Islamic institute in Hebron and injured two Arab mayors by planting bombs in their cars, in retribution for a terrorist attack that killed six Jews in Hebron. The "underground" was exposed on the very night that some of its members planned to blow up three Arab buses. It was also revealed that these Jewish terrorists had a plan, which they had merely delayed, to destroy the Dome on the Rock on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, an apocalyptic act that would force the end of the days scenario and the final victory.

The head of my yeshiva, in other words, was right. His rhetoric was grimly vindicated by reality, and in its details: one of the members of the "underground" was a former student of the same yeshiva who went to Samaria in 1973. The story of this particular individual is also the story of the radicalization of Gush Emunim, and a significant chapter in the story of the rise of the radical right in Israel. Immediately after the discovery of the terrorist network, Gush Emunim condemned its activities; but after a while it became clear that the members of the network came from the midst of the settlers movement. At this point the Gush leadership split: some condemned their "underground," some disapproved of the violence but understood its motives, some claimed that the underground did the right thing at the time.

In 1973 Gush Emunim presented itself as the revival of a higher idealism, of the pioneer tradition of classical Zionism; but a decade later the idealists had taken up arms and were defying the Jewish state in the most dangerous way. When, in the wake of the Six-Day War, the right emerged as a serious political force in Israel, Gush Emunim and most of the Israeli right expressed a position toward the Palestinian population that was full of optimism and good intentions; it amounted only to the insistence that Israel should annex the territories that it conquered in 1967, and some even promised that the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza would be granted full civil rights.

By the '80s, however, members of the Gush were engaged in violent clashes with this same Palestinian population, and in 1983 a poll cited by Sprinzak revealed that 65 percent of the settlers agreed to the statement that "it is necessary for the settlers to respond quickly and independently to Arab harassment of settlers and of settlements." By the beginning of the '90s, moreover, many of the settlers and the rest of the radical right came more and more openly to support the repugnant notion that is euphemistically known as "transfer," which amounts to a plan to pressure the Arab residents to leave their land in the territories, or to expel them forcibly.

What were the causes of the radicalization of the right, and what does it mean to the future of Israel? These are the pressing questions addressed in Sprinzak's perceptive and thoroughly documented book. The radical right in Israel is not, of course, an underground operation; it lives and operates and thrives as a legitimate force above ground. Besides Gush Emunim, which is an extraparliamentary organization that functions as its settling vanguard and its hard-core ideological group, the radical right consists of three parties in the Knesset: Tehiyah ("Revival") has five seats, Zomet ("Crossroads") has two seats, and Moledet ("Homeland") has another two seats. It also enjoys significant support, a kind of de facto division of labor, in the Likud and the NRP.

As Sprinzak correctly points out, the radical Israeli right is different from the radical European right of this century, which held to a militaristic, authoritarian, anti-socialist, and anti-democratic ideology. The Israeli radical right is defined, more precisely, by a combination of four elements or moods, which form a general political and historical outlook rather than a systematic ideology.

The first is an ambiguous attitude toward the democratic institutions of Israel, and a willingness to oppose the law and the government when it comes to what the radical right understands as the rights and the security needs of Israel and the settlers. Unlike fascism, this is not an ideological rejection of parliamentary democracy as a decadent ideology of the bourgeoisie; it is, rather, an ongoing erosion of democratic principles for the sake of an interpretation of the national interest. The second characteristic of the radical Israeli right is its increasingly violent confrontation with the Palestinian population, and its call for harsher measures in the treatment of this population. The radical Israeli right believes that coexistence with the Palestinians is impossible, and more and more it appears to believe that "transfer" is the only solution.

This is accompanied by a siege mentality—the third defining feature of the Israeli right—that distinguishes absolutely between "us" and "them," "them" being the rest of the world. This has resulted in a supreme disregard, a proud scorn, for pragmatism and realpolitik, which is denounced as evidence of a failed imagination or will or spirit. Since the world is definitionally against "us," no policy that Israel could conceivably pursue could conceivably improve Israel's circumstances. To compromise in any way, therefore, is to confer another advantage on the enemy. (Compromise is anyway motivated by a base, self-loathing need to please the goyim.) This suspicion of ordinary political and diplomatic action has been broached again by the recent renewal of the peace process. The matter of how much Israel

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should take into account its relationship with the United States has drawn a line between the right and the radical right: Shamir, who originated in the old radical right and is a frequent sympathizer with the new radical right, seems to care somewhat about Israeli-American relations, while Sharon, one of the champions of the radical right, opposed Israel's participation in the peace process and denies that Israel's relationship with America matters very much for its future.

The fourth, and most interesting, characteristic of these Israeli extremists is their radicalization of their religiosity, their messianic activism. This right represents not only a new political phenomenon of post-1967 Israeli life, but also a new interpretation of Judaism (for some of us believing Jews, a chilling and frightening interpretation). To be sure, it is important to distinguish between the religious message of the radicals and their support among the wider population. Sprinzak estimates that 20 percent to 25 percent of the Jewish population in Israel supports the radicals, but that support is not based mainly on religious or other ideological convictions, but on fear of the Arab world and the Palestinians, and on the growing impatience of this constituency with a life lived under a permanent threat to one's existence. Attitudes of fear, insecurity, impatience, and resentment, some of which may be plausibly explained by Arab actions and policies, are skillfully exploited by the radical right, which promises a solution once and for all. The Israeli right, in sum, is a combustion of messianic politics with the politics of fear and resentment.

Fundamentalism is a term that is used by Sprinzak and some other authors to describe this religious right. I am not sure that they are correct to use the term, if by fundamentalism they mean a return to a literal reading of authoritative texts. Religiously, Gush Emunim is a very unliteral and innovative movement. The roots of the radicals' interpretation of Judaism are in the messianic understanding of Zionism that was articulated by Rabbi Abraham Kook. (Under the leadership of his son Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook, the yeshiva that he established in Jerusalem became the ideological avant-garde of the radical religious right.) Kook was an extraordinary figure, a Talmudic scholar and a highly original mystical thinker—and a passionate Zionist. He was born in Latvia in 1865, immigrated to Palestine in 1904, and became the first chief rabbi of the yishuv. (He died in 1935.)

In Kook's interpretation, the popular impression that secular Zionism negated the fundamental tenets of traditional Judaism was deceptive. It was, quite the contrary, an important step forward in God's scheme of redemption. The purity of the quest of the socialist Zionist pioneers for a just society deeply impressed Kook. He understood their project in religious terms, as an alternative to a diaspora Judaism that had become a Judaism of the synagogue and the kitchen. Their rebellion against the tradition would force the tradition to address the larger issues of social justice, and it would invigorate Judaism with new energies in its mystical mission to mend the world. In Hegelian terms, which were dear to Kook, a higher synthesis will emerge out of the secular Zionist negation, and this higher synthesis will be the consummation of the messianic process. In this unexpected and deeply pious way, Kook not only legitimated the participation of religious Jews in the Zionist enterprise, he also conferred great spiritual status upon the state as the instrument of redemption.

Nor was that all. Kook also taught a new understanding of Jewish messianism. In traditional Judaism, messianism is not the imminent and immanent telos of history's dialectical progress. It is a rupture in history, an intervention from outside, which has a fixed and predetermined time. But Kook insisted that Jewish messianism be understood dialectically, in a Hegelian manner—which also explains why Gush Emunim is the first messianic movement in Jewish history that is not centered around a figure who claims to be the Messiah. The messianism of the Gush is not about the Messiah, it is about the messianic era.

This reading of messianism enabled Gush Emunin to disregard the harsh restraints on messianic political activity that exist in Jewish tradition. The Talmud warns against those who calculate the end of the days; and the traumatic events that followed the messianism of the Shabtai Zvi in the seventeenth century strengthened the traditional aversion to messianic activities. According to Kook's disciples, however, messianism is a historical, dialectical process that we are invited to join and to enhance. The establishment of the state of Israel, the "ingathering of the exiles" to Israel, and the victory in the Six-Day War were all steps in the redemptive progression. (The dialectic, as usual, is flexible: setbacks in the process, such as the Yom Kippur War or the Camp David accords, may be explained as an eschatological *reculer pour mieux sauter.*)

Thus the extreme caution of traditional Jewish politics was replaced by a sacred disregard for earthly political considerations, since Israel is in the middle of a predetermined redemptive process and no force can stop it anymore. If, for traditional Jews, messianism was a mode of expectation, for Gush Emunim it is a mode of political action. And the inner logic of such messianism ends up in desperate attempts to move the process along when it seems to be stuck. The plan to blow up the mosque was this sort of messianic prodding. It was a very far cry from what Kook had in mind, but it was a result of his mode of thinking. Just as messianism always turns into false messianism, so messianic activity gave birth to desperate and destructive adventures.

The Gush ideology has taken much from Kook's Hegelianism in its attitude toward the land, too. The relationship between the people of Israel and the land of Israel is described organically. The land is the natural place, ontologically the only place, for the flourishing of the spiritual ideals and achievements of the people. In the diaspora the Jews overdeveloped their culture's intellectual tendency, but in the land of Israel they may regain their intuitive capabilities. Indeed, prophecy will be restored, and direct, unmediated access to the divine will be possible.

This romantic theology has concrete political implications. In accordance with its organic conception of the sanctity of the land, for example, the Gush compare territorial compromise to the amputation of a limb. In Jewish law, there are only three commandments that a person must not transgress on pain of death: idolatry, incest, and murder. Or, to put it in contemporary terms, there are three, and only three, commandments that supersede considerations of physical security. For this reason, many contemporary rabbinical authorities, such as the influential Rabbi Eliezer Shach, rule that a government is obligated to give up territories for the sake of a peace that will result in the saving of lives. The rabbis affiliated with Gush Emunim, by contrast, rule that no government is allowed to give up territories even for the sake of peace. It is very difficult to defend such a ruling on the basis of a literal reading of the law. This ruling that a land-for-peace compromise is prohibited by Jewish law is hardly an instance of fundamentalism. It is, instead, a new ideology that carries the traditional rabbinic ideas about the sacredness of the land to the absurd conclusion that land is more sacred than life.

One of the amusing ironies of this

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debate always comes when Gush Emunim condemns its religious opponents on the left for drawing their liberal and democratic values from the West. They, the Gush, flatter themselves. Their controlling ideas are not as rabbinic or as authentic as they think. Ultranationalism, the deification of the state, and the organic conception of land and people are not traditional Jewish categories. They have their roots in the West, too. Indeed, some of the last Hegelians are to be found in a yeshiva in Jerusalem. This must be what Hegel used to call the cunning of reason.

The radical right's reinterpretation of tradition extends also to the relationship between Jews and Arabs. Meir Kahane used to quote the biblical account of Joshua's conquest of the land of Canaan as the Jewish paradigm for treating the indigenous enemies: just as Joshua expelled the Canaanites from the land, so should the Palestinians be expelled. This may look a lot like fundamentalism, but it is more properly described as a sloppy reading of the text. In the Bible, the harsh treatment of the Canaanites was justified by the desire to eradicate paganism from the land (which does not, of course, make these passages more pleasant to ponder). The biblical war was not a national conflict over possession of the land. It was a war between monotheists and pagans. I do not know whether Israeli secularists in Tel Aviv are more or less pagan than Palestinian monotheists in Nablus, but one thing is clear: their conflict has very little to do with the Bible. And the view to the contrary not only poisons the political atmosphere, it also represents a really diabolical deformation of Judaism for political purposes.

Again, Sprinzak is right in his insistence that the radical right in Israel is not only religiously based. Among the 100,000 settlers in the West Bank, 20,000 or so are members of the Gush. Some of the most prominent parliamentary representatives of the radical right, such as Rafael Eitan, the former chief of staff, or Rehavam Zeevi, the former general who is the outspoken proponent of "transfer," are thoroughly secular. Their appeal is not to religious ideology, but to suspicion and fear and the desire for a forceful solution. Why did *this* element flourish politically in the '80s?

One of the main reasons, surely, was the impotence of the center and the moderate right in their defense of the status quo. After 1967 both Labor and Likud were convinced that Israel could maintain the territories in a relatively peaceful fashion without annexation. Moshe Dayan championed a concept that he called "enlightened occupation." In such a view, the Palestinian population would be treated fairly, its standard of living would rise, and Israel would be an occupier preferable to Jordan. In many respects, this was the case: the Palestinians have prospered more under Israeli rule than under Jordanian rule, and in the years following 1967 Israel faced a relatively peaceful population and violent clashes occurred only with marginal terrorist cells.

The problem, of course, is that the Palestinians have different and greater aspirations than prosperity. (You would have thought that Zionists would have easily understood this.) After twenty-five years of Israel's rule, therefore, the status quo seems more shaky and more problematic. Whatever its other achievements, the intifada certainly accomplished the ruin of the concept of "enlightened occupation." Israel began to pay the moral price of occupation. The wide range of Palestinian civil disobedience forced Israel to clash not only with terrorist groups, but this time with the whole civilian population. The settlements in the midst of the Palestinian population created constant, and occasionally violent, friction between Palestinians and Israelis. The conflict between governments and states and armies that is known as "the Arab-Israeli conflict" was suddenly widened to include a conflict between two populations.

This became, and remains, a war without a front, in which every civilian Palestinian or civilian Israeli is a potential enemy. For many years, when they lived with a war with a front, many Israelis tolerated the threat to their security without turning to the extreme right. As de facto annexation brought the front closer to home, however, and finally made the front disappear altogether, the psychological atmosphere was ripe for the rise of the radical right.

And the radicals were correct in their claim that the center has no solution. Sprinzak quotes one of Kahane's typically racist speeches: "I am telling you what each of you thinks deep in his heart: there is only one solution, no other, no partial solution: the Arabs out! out!... Do not ask me how.... Let me become defense minister for two months and you will not have a single cockroach around here! I promise you a *clean* Eretz Yisrael." "I say what you think" was one of Kahane's brilliant slogans. Israeli politics became increasingly polarized between the alternatives of territorial compromise and transfer: either you move out of the territories to disentan-

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gle the two clashing populations or you engage in the ugly transfer. The status quo lost its legitimacy.

It was the inability of both the Labor and Likud leaderships to foresee the cycle of violence and fear that would result from the de facto annexation of 1.8 million Palestinians to Israel that was the main cause of this radicalization. The center wants a democratic state and a Jewish state, but the difficult truth is that under the present demographic conditions Israel cannot be both. If Israel grants full citizenship to the Palestinians in the territories, then Israel will become a binational state. If it does not grant them citizenship, it will not be a democracy. This is the bind from which the center cannot free itself; and if its paralysis continues, the popularity of the radical right will grow. The issue is not only land for peace. No honest dove can say with certainty that a surrender of land will result in eternal peace, since nobody can guarantee that a new Saddam Hussein will not emerge. The issue, more precisely, is land for a democratic and sane Israel.

These are the days when the character of Israel will be tested. The Palestinians are finally showing signs of political sobriety, having turned up for James Baker's negotiations in the hope of achieving nothing more than a niggardly version of Camp David-style autonomy; and Syria is left alone, without the support of the Soviet Union, for another round of war with Israel. What if Yitzhak Shamir's government remains in power and decides on a deal? I think that Sprinzak is correct in his assumption that Shamir will not be able to overcome the opposition of the radical right to compromise. In the rather unlikely event of such a compromise, however, Shamir will probably enjoy wide support, and the messianic right may find itself suddenly isolated.

The great riddle, of course, is Shamir himself. Is he a creature of the radical right or not? It is worth remembering that one of the main effects of a new extremism is its effect upon the extremes that preceded it. The emergence of the radical right in Israel has had the consequence of legitimizing the earlier radicals, who now look like moderates or centrists. Kahane made Sharon look moderate; and compared with Sharon, Shamir and his allies in the Likud seem to be smack in the middle. Sprinzak's thoughtful book leaves a nagging question: Are Israel's present radicals its future moderates?

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The Secrets of Citizenship

BY LAWRENCE H. FUCHS

Out of the Barrio: Toward a New Politics of Hispanic Assimilation by Linda Chavez

(Basic Books, 208 pp., $23)

In his autobiography, *Barrio Boy*, Ernesto Galarza, a leader of the Chicano movement in the 1950s and 1960s, tells of struggling to get out of a Sacramento barrio by working hard in the fields in the summer, then working his way through Occidental College, Stanford, and Columbia, where he received his doctorate in economics. Hard work, as well as the mastery of English, were also keys to escaping the barrio for Richard Rodriguez, another Mexican-American whose memoir, *Hunger of Memory* (1982), charted his emergence as a successful writer and teacher. It is a little odd that Linda Chavez never mentions Galarza or Rodriguez in her book, but their stories constitute remarkable testimonials to her argument that Mexican-Americans and other Hispanics knew how to get out of the barrio by studying, by working hard, and by participating in American civic life without the assistance of government-sponsored ethnic-conscious policies such as bilingual education, which, in her view, do more harm than good.

And their stories support her argument in other ways, too. For both Galarza and Rodriguez, the mastery of English was a ticket to effectiveness and success that didn't erode their affection for Mexican culture. Similarly, their love for *la raza* did not keep them from becoming patriotic Mexican-Americans. When Galarza was attacked for his fight against the exploitation of agricultural workers, he responded: "Can't they see? I love this country in a way that people don't if they are born here." Chavez loves this country, too. Unlike Galarza and Rodriguez, however, she has not written about what it was like to live in a barrio, or about a personal struggle to emerge from it. She has written something rather narrower, an attack on Mexican-American leaders, on the "power brokers," who, she charges, keep Mexican-Americans and other Hispanics in the barrio by practicing a politics of permanent victimization.

Such a politics, she correctly points out, often leads to a politics of separatism and divisiveness. Chavez argues that such leaders are substantially out of touch with large numbers of the people they purport to serve when they advocate language, affirmative action, welfare, and immigration policies that actually retard the upward mobility of Hispanics and alienate them from other Americans. The power brokers and their liberal allies, she maintains, are at least as self-interested as they are well-meaning. They have created an ethnic group advocacy industry, spinning off affirmative action and equal opportunity officers, bilingual teachers and supervisors, and immigration lawyers. They shamelessly buttress their arguments by manipulating statistics to show that little progress has been made by Hispanics in recent decades, neglecting to point out that statistics often include illegal aliens and recent immigrants who cannot be expected to have made much progress in education or employment compared with third-generation Mexican-Americans, who actually have done well.

But the attack on the self-interestedness of the professional elites is hardly worth the amount of attention that Chavez gives it. It is true that leaders of the Mexican-American Legal and Education Defense Fund (MALDEF) need cases and clients who have grievances, and rhetoric about victimization serves that need. But it is also true that there are clients with real grievances. What matters is whether or not the ethnic-conscious policies that the leaders advocate actually help Hispanics escape the barrio or hurt them, and whether they lead to a stronger, more unified nation or one that is torn by ethnic strife.

Chavez is so preoccupied with her attack on ethnic-conscious policies and the power brokers who advocate them that she tells us virtually nothing about the history of the Hispanic population in the United States, not even about its growth from fewer than 2 million in 1940 to 20 million in 1990. (The His-

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panic population of the United States is projected to reach 31 million by 2010.) Prior to the 1960s that population was overwhelmingly of Mexican origin. Before the Mexican revolution in 1910, there were Hispanic families in the Southwest who traced their history in that area back to Spanish colonial times, before the accession of the northern half of Mexico by the United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. Between 1910 and 1930 approximately 700,000 Mexican immigrants came to this country, but a considerable number returned to Mexico during the Depression. A large number of immigrants arrived in the 1950s and through the next three decades, giving the border cities, towns, and *colonias* or barrios that grew up around them a distinctive border culture.

The proportion of the total Hispanic population that was of Mexican origin declined from 70 percent in 1950 to 60 percent in 1980, due to the influx of Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and emigrants from Central and South America. The 1950 census had counted only 70,000 persons of Puerto Rican background on the mainland, but by 1980 there were 2 million, concentrated heavily in New York City and New Jersey, and to a lesser extent in communities in more than a dozen other states. Mexicans and Mexican-Americans still were somewhat concentrated in the five southwestern states of Arizona, New Mexico, California, Colorado, and Texas (more than 50 percent lived in California and Texas in 1980), but they became much more widely dispersed during the 1970s, and by 1980 they constituted more than 5 percent of the population in the Northeast, 6 percent in the South, and 14.5 percent in the West. Although Cubans accounted for only 6 percent of the Spanish-origin population in 1980, they represented higher proportions in several states—55 percent in Florida, 16 percent in New Jersey, 10 percent in Georgia, and 8 percent in both Maryland and Louisiana. And a rising proportion of the Spanish-origin population (21 percent in 1980) came from other Spanish-speaking countries, such as the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Colombia, and Ecuador.

Chavez's failure to tell readers anything about barrios or *colonias*, as rural concentrations of Mexicans are often called in the Southwest, is even less excusable than her omission of any discussion of the history and the demography of the Latino population of this country. For what exactly is a barrio, and why would anyone want to get out of it? Stan Steiner, in *La Raza*, called it a "communal colony" over twenty years ago. He visited rural barrios on the outskirts of the cities, often the colonies of migrant workers who moved from one barrio to another, each with inadequate sewage, education, or other basic facilities and services. From such barrios there were nearly 2 million deportations of Mexicans in 1953 and 1954, most (but not all) illegal aliens. It was in such barrios that Cesar Chavez, the intrepid Mexican-American labor leader, grew up, attending more than thirty schools before the seventh grade.

The fast urbanization of the Southwest in recent decades absorbed Mexican-American barrios that had begun as agricultural labor communities. The barrios remained, but the population was no longer concentrated in agricultural work. Other barrios grew out of former labor camps that brought together Mexican-American railroad workers or miners. And there are central city barrios with large populations, such as the South Bronx and East Los Angeles, where by 1960 approximately 135,000 Mexican-origin persons made up more than three-quarters of the total population. Although Chavez never tells us what she means by a barrio, she cannot mean well-to-do Cuban-American neighborhoods in Miami or Mexican-American communities in San Antonio. She means the poor urban barrios of more than a dozen large and middle-sized cities and the rural *colonias* of the border cities and the rural areas around them. It is in such areas that Spanish-speaking immigrants and Latino Americans are plagued by unemployment, underemployment, and poor educational and health facilities. It is in such places that drugs often replace hope.

In making her case against ethnic conscious policies, Chavez picks the two easiest targets: bilingual education and the amendments to the 1965 Voting Rights Act passed in 1982. The argument against the way the Bilingual Education Act has been implemented is a familiar one, resting on data and analysis developed by half a dozen scholars and polemicists over the past twenty years, most recently by Rosalie Pedalino Porter in her book *Forked Tongue*. To the considerable extent that the bilingual

The Death of Penelope

She went, as you would guess, in her famous,
perversely faithful bed, alone, longing
for her lost boy (wandering desperately
God knows where), her absent daughter (hostage
to a grieving, all-but-luckless suitor,
a petty, hostile man, by all accounts,
incapable of gratitude for what
little luck he onetime must have held),
and longing, if only a little less,
for the hero, long estranged and never
heard from after parting for "one last journey"
to plant an oar in some flat wilderness.
One supposes the clever man must have run
clean through his gamut of tricks, and run out
of stories, too, perhaps, as he lay face
down in a stony, treeless field, far from home,
his vast holdings, but approaching the deep,
unpleasant laughter of the inside,
oracular joke, witnessing the dissolve
of all topography, finding against
his face the grinning abyss, himself
unable to let go the little oar.

But as the woman lay dying, for whom
the many-passaged myth was always her
own story, as she lay tasting this new,
sudden pain, which took each harshest, prior
trial and made each a mere cordial
leading to this full draught of bitterness,
just as she glanced about, about to find
herself finally overrun with sorrows,
she found across the room's pure air her loom,
emptied of work, bright with erasure,
bearing only the nothing that suggests,
in its blank face, an approaching visage,
in its stillness, a note rising, as she
fully consumed by pain also rises,
imagines she stares back reading her long
tale of vacancies, pattern of absence,
and constructs of these a new, a stranger
story, now commencing. As the faithless
body and its weakness for toleration
fall finally to the misshapen tree,
Penelope rises, releases her gown,
begins the journey, nothing in her hands.

Scott Cairns

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education industry has turned what was meant to be one of several strategies for helping youngsters deficient in English learn English into a program to maintain Spanish language and culture, it has often handicapped students rather than helped them move on to higher education and better jobs. And to the extent that it has packaged its approach in anti-assimilationist rhetoric, it has encouraged others to believe that Hispanics do not want to be Americans, an image that Chavez shows is absurdly untrue for most of them.

Still, her case would be stronger if she did not make the history of bilingual education sound as though it were a conspiracy to undermine American unity. "The purpose," she writes, "is not to assimilate Hispanic children, however, but to maintain and strengthen their ethnic identity." The movement certainly did not begin in a conspiracy. I remember collecting essays from Puerto Rican youngsters about twenty-five years ago and asking them to describe their earliest experiences in school before they learned English. They spoke of being sick to their stomachs, throwing up, and generally being miserable because they could not make themselves understood to their teachers. Today there are hundreds of bilingual teachers who support the philosophy of transition to English and teach accordingly. But Chavez is not one for presenting data that complicate her argument.

She is basically right, though, in stating that the bilingual education industry, which controls all but 25 percent of federal funds to help English-deficient children, has promoted the growth of maintenance programs. She would have applauded the remarks of Father Theodore Hesburgh, who, as chairman of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, listened carefully to a representative from MALDEF in 1980 testify that school was the only institution that could help youngsters maintain their ancestral languages and cultures. Hesburgh retorted: "I thought there already was an institution that was supposed to do that. It's called the family."

But Chavez's invocation of family self-help as the solution to the dismal predicament of many Hispanics is too simple. She writes that the immigrants "have no alternative but to work to provide for themselves and their families. But Puerto Ricans are well versed in public assistance.... About 70 percent of all persons living in Puerto Rico receive some form of government assistance." She fails to analyze the destructive effect on Puerto Rican families of moving back and forth to and from the mainland; it is a major factor in the high rate of marital separation, which results in single parent female-headed households. Nor does she acknowledge the possibility that many Puerto Ricans who left poverty and moved to California or other parts of the country may have been saved at some point by food stamps, Head Start, a job training program, or a special nutrition program for mothers, infants, and children. If Chavez has met any government program targeted specifically to help poor families, who happen to be disproportionately Hispanic and black, we don't learn of them here.

In her attack on the way the Voting Rights Act has been used to gerrymander districts to promote the election of Hispanics, Chavez distills an analysis told effectively by Abigail Thernstrom in *Whose Votes Count?* The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 tortured the original intention of the legislation, which was to protect the voting rights of blacks, into a policy that promotes the election of candidates just because they are Hispanic or black. In striking down a Louisiana statute that required nomination papers and ballots in all elections to designate the race of candidates, the Supreme Court ruled in 1964 against a law "which may decisively influence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines." The evil in the statute, the Court held, was "in placing the power of the state behind a racial classification that induces racial prejudice at the polls." But that is just what Congress did in 1982 by obliging local jurisdictions to jiggle their electoral district lines with the aim of electing more Hispanic and black candidates. "It is a good issue for the power brokers," argues Chavez, but it does not produce a good result for Hispanics, blacks, or the United States, because it encourages whites to vote racially and leads to the kind of tribal conflict that is destroying so much of the world.

Chavez overlooks one possible objection to her case, the refutation of which would have bolstered her position even more. There is ample evidence that the election of Hispanics stimulates political interest and participation by Hispanics, which was also true for the Irish, Germans, Italians, and others. There was a surge of Mexican-American political activity in the Southwest as a result of the election of Mexican-American governors in Arizona and New Mexico in 1974. And as Mexican-Americans enlarged their role in electoral politics (there were more than 600 state legislators of Mexican ancestry in the Southwest as early as 1967), the more militant separatist groups lost their appeal.

But that political activity (Mexican-American voter registration in Texas grew from 488,000 in 1975 to 798,000 in 1980) took place before the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, which made it legal for any Mexican-American to charge discrimination if election results showed that the number of Mexican-Americans elected was not pro-

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

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There has been much emphasis for years, intensified in recent months, on the "land for peace" formula to solve the long-simmering problems of the Middle East. Translating this slogan into plain English means that Israel should surrender Judea-Samaria (the "West Bank") and Gaza to the Arabs. They would establish a Palestinian state. Once that happened, it is thought that peace and tranquility would soon come to the troubled Middle East.

What are the facts?

■ The concept of "land for peace" is a totally new one in the history of the world. It was formulated for one specific purpose only, namely to persuade and pressure Israel to give up territories that it has administered since the Six-Day War of 1967. By its victory in that war, Israel wound up in possession of these territories. Contrary to what many are led to believe, the "West Bank," the focus of today's attention, had never been part of any Arab country. It was part of Palestine, a territorial unit that, by the Mandate of the League of Nations and in line with the Balfour Declaration, had been designated as a national home for the Jewish people.

■ Thus, while the concept of "land for peace" is a brand-new one, the concept that to the victor belong the spoils is as old as history itself and had really never been questioned before the days of the Israel-Arab conflict. Our own country, of course, following its Manifest Destiny, has benefited greatly and has consolidated its territory by applying this motto. But Israel followed a different path. From the day of victory in 1967, it waited for an offer of peace from the Arabs. But that offer never came. Instead, immediately following the war, the Arabs pronounced their three unalterable "no's:" no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel.

■ In 1977, President Sadat of Egypt traveled to Jerusalem and presented a peace plan to the Israeli government. The Israelis eagerly embraced his suggestion. In exchange for peace and normalization of relations with its neighbor, Israel returned to Egypt the vast Sinai peninsula, together with the city of Yamit; some of the most advanced military installations in the world; the port and naval installations of Sharm-el-Sheik, which safeguard Israel's access to its port of Eilat; and the oil fields that Israel had developed and which had made Israel self-sufficient in its energy requirements. And, of course, Israel also gave up the natural buffer against aggression that the Suez Canal and the strategic depth of the Sinai itself provided. It was a first in history. Never before in the chronicle of mankind had the victor returned conquered territory to the vanquished in order to attain peace.

■ One would expect that the concept of "land for peace" would work both ways. After all, should not the Arabs also make some territorial sacrifices for peace? Unfortunately, that is not the case. Every inch of land held by the Arabs is considered "holy Arab soil" and its possession by the "infidels" (Christians or Jews) is inadmissible, intolerable, a blasphemy and a case for "jihad" (holy war). No compromise, no concession is ever possible. The way the "Taba issue" was finally resolved further illustrates the Arab belief that the "land for peace" principle is basically a one-way street.

■ The "land for peace" formulation is now applied mostly to the Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank") and Gaza regions. Israel's foes, but also some of its friends, urge Israel to yield these regions to the Arabs, in exchange for "peace." But there is no peace, and no peace will come about by Israel's giving up this area of vital strategic importance to those who are its sworn enemies and who have declared over and over again that they wish to use this land as their launching pad for the final attempt at the destruction of Israel. The conflict in the area is not only between Israel and the "Palestinians." It is first of all between Israel and the Arab nations. With the single exception of Egypt, virtually all of them are still in a state of war with Israel.

To none of the Arab countries has the possibility ever occurred of *their* trading land for peace, for instance yielding the "West Bank" to Israel for the sake of peace. Not one of these countries has even hinted that they would make peace with Israel if Israel yielded the administered territories to the Arabs. There isn't even a gesture of accommodation, such as a lifting of the over 40-year-old Arab economic boycott against Israel, an apology for the odious slander that Zionism is Racism, or a discontinuation of the yearly charade in the United Nations, in which the Arab states attempt to expel Israel from that body. For the victor to yield land for peace to the vanquished is a new idea—who knows, it might even be a good one. But it surely would have to work both ways in order to be valid and effective.

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portionate to the group's population in a particular district. It was not enough that the Voting Rights Act already provided for bilingual ballots, and that any proposed change in electoral jurisdictions should come under federal scrutiny to prevent discrimination against minorities; now Congress passed an invidious piece of legislation under the banner of civil rights, one that was not on the mind of Martin Luther King Jr. or the rest of us when we marched from Selma to Montgomery in 1965 to demand voting rights for blacks.

Chavez would have strengthened her case against the 1982 amendments had she avoided a blanket indictment of "power brokers." Most Hispanic advocacy groups are in the tradition of ethnic group advocacy begun by German-Americans more than 150 years ago. They seek to promote their own kind as candidates, but they focus mainly on the issues, hoping to elect sympathetic representatives from whatever background. And, until 1982, they never asked the federal government to gerrymander districts to promote the election of their own kind. The League of United Latin-American Citizens (LULAC), formed in 1929 in Texas, quickly achieved a national membership by emphasizing opposition to discrimination and segregation and stressing the importance of entering into mainstream American society. In the 1940s and 1950s Mexican-American veterans created the "American GI Forum of Texas" to promote their needs through increased political participation, and in California Mexican-Americans began the Community Service Organization, focusing on local political action and community involvement.

It was under their stimulus and that of the Viva Kennedy clubs, organizations supporting the candidacies of John F. Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, that Mexican-Americans began voting in larger numbers. But the 1982 amendments created a presumption that enfranchisement is reduced for Hispanic and black voters unless governments rework electoral districts to promote the election of Hispanics and blacks, which, of course, also implies that whites should be represented by whites, Gujarati Indians by Gujarati Indians, Cubans by Cubans, Colombians by Colombians, Ecuadoreans by Ecuadoreans, and so on. The 1982 amendments, happily acquiesced to by the Bush administration despite its protests against affirmative action, undermine the principle that individuals should be free to make choices across racial, ethnic, and religious boundaries; and it almost ensures the success of the

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David Dukes, at least in localities.

Congress should take a hard look at the 1982 amendments and ask whether it prefers a country in which voters are told by their government that they will be better off if they vote racially or ethnically regardless of other factors, or one in which voters are encouraged to think about their interests—economic, social, ethnic, occupational—in ways that lead them to form coalitions with other like-minded persons regardless of race or ethnicity. In Houston last November, a white-Hispanic coalition elected Gracie Saenz, a former prosecutor, as the first Hispanic to a city-wide council seat. Earlier, Hispanic politicians had pressed unsuccessfully for a redistricting plan that would have eliminated five city-wide positions on the fourteen-member city council in favor of a body made up of sixteen single-member districts in order to be able to elect a Hispanic. But Saenz was elected anyway, winning a majority of white votes (whites make up 60 percent of the electorate). Her visibility and her influence will be much larger than if she had been elected from a small, heavily Hispanic district. And Houston is much better off for not being encouraged to vote strictly along ethnic and racial lines.

Chavez believes (as I do) that at least as much respect should be paid to the requirements of the *unum* as to the demands of the *pluribus*. But there is a curious paradox in her book, of which she seems unaware. Despite all the divisive clamoring of power brokers, and despite policies that tend to make us ethnic- and race-minded, there has been more crossing of ethnic and racial boundaries in recent decades than ever before. In her attempt to counter those who argue for a politics of victimization, Chavez tells of the economic and spatial mobility of Mexican-Americans and Cuban-Americans. She writes of strong Cuban-American and Mexican-American families and of rising rates of homeownership and intermarriage. She mentions the decline of the militant separatist Mexican-American political groups of the 1960s and 1970s.

So, if everything is so good, why are the power brokers so bad? To Chavez, it is clear that they and the ethnic-minded policies they push have caused unadulterated harm. There is no acknowledgment of the accomplishments of MALDEF (on whose board of directors I served for four years). MALDEF worked tirelessly to see that the one person-one vote principle established by the Supreme Court early in the 1960s was followed in the West and Southwest and, sometimes in cooperation with the Southwest Voter Registration Project, it initiated lawsuits and other action to enforce the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended in 1975. As a result of initiatives by MALDEF and other Mexican-American groups, political participation rose in Houston, San Antonio, Dallas, and other cities.

What is wrong with Chavez's book is what is left out: the good, however limited or complicated, that has been done through race- and ethnic-conscious remedies in education, housing, and employment; the awareness of continuing prejudice and discrimination in those areas, particularly in housing, although less so against Hispanics than blacks; the failure to recognize that most of those who live in chronically poor ethnic communities, such as large numbers of Puerto Ricans in the Northeast, will not escape by bootstrapping alone; and the absence of any constructive suggestions for government's role in promoting opportunity for persistently poor Americans.

Also missing is an understanding of how much the struggles of contemporary immigrant-ethnic groups are similar to, not different from, those of other groups in American history, despite contemporary ethnic-conscious government policies. By insisting on their rights as Americans, by forming political groups, by emphasizing issues of particular interest such as immigration and language, and by combining a love and admiration for their ancestral culture with loyalty to their American citizenship, Hispanic-Americans are behaving much like the children and grandchildren of Irish, German, Scandinavian, Polish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants. Chavez greatly oversimplifies when she asserts that in contrast to ethnic group leaders in the past "now ethnic leaders demand that their groups remain separate." The leaders of MALDEF, LULAC, and several other groups are no less patriotic than the leaders of European ethnic groups were.

Chavez, who was staff director of the Civil Rights Commission during the Reagan administration, argues correctly that much of what is called affirmative action, including the two policies she targets, does not address the problems of chronically poor Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics. These policies also probably distract ethnic leaders and politicians from working more directly on those problems. But Chavez may not appreciate how much affirmative action policies have helped to desegregate fire and police departments and educational institutions, or to bring competent Hispanics and blacks to management positions in large corporations. Does anyone believe that in the Philadelphia construction industry, where the concept of numerical goals and timetables was first applied during the Nixon administration, the percentage of minority construction workers would have risen from 1 to 12 between 1969 and 1981 without affirmative action? Does anyone doubt that this nation is a lot stronger because the number of black police officers nationwide increased from 24,000 in 1970 to 43,000 in 1980 partly because of affirmative action programs? In her attack on all ethnic-conscious policies, Chavez uses a shotgun instead of a rifle. In this respect, she is not much different from ethnic group advocates and liberal politicians who have never met an affirmative action program they didn't like.

It is time that liberals woke up to the fact that language maintenance programs hurt Hispanic children and the country, that government policies that promote racial- and ethnic-minded voting are divisive and potentially explosive. The aim of bilingual education as a pedagogic strategy to teach English is a laudable one, and vigorous efforts are still needed to overcome discrimination against blacks and, to a lesser extent, Latinos, especially in housing and employment. But the prospect for building a decent multiethnic society is weakened as long as liberals fail to make distinctions between those affirmative action programs that protect individual rights, thereby strengthening the nation, and those that establish ethnic and racial group entitlements, thereby dividing us. Most Americans realize that there is something wrong with a knee-jerk defense of every program that flies under the banner of affirmative action, and it is just such a reaction that permits the manipulation of white fear by reactionary and even conservative politicians.

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TRB *continued from page 6*

enthusiasm for the right-wing social agenda.

I defend George Bush against the unfair and vicious charge that he is not a loyal keeper of the Reaganite flame. The fair and vicious charge is exactly the opposite.

MICHAEL KINSLEY

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CAIRO DIARIST

Down the Nile

ARE THERE 20 MILLION PEOPLE IN this inchoate sprawl or something closer to 15 million? No one can say for sure; all you know is that, day by day, the roads and water supply and housing—most especially housing—give way to the burden of new arrivals, young people drawn from the hinterlands to a modernity they have not known but have glimpsed on television. Cairenes are ingenious people, and a half million or more have moved into the City of the Dead, where they live among the tombs. Still, there is the aura of prosperity in the capital: the great square and circles designed by the French and British during the last century still accommodate the swarming crowds—and the cars, each of which seems driven by some homicidal maniac and none of which is governed by emission controls. My informants don't trust any census. But they tell me that the country's population hovers at 60 million. That is, it hovers today at 60 million. By the second millennium it will be 75 million; a decade later 100 million. Every two-and-a-half years or so it grows by the Jewish population of Israel.

ANWAR SADAT AND A FEW OF HIS advisers grasped the implications of this analogy a decade and a half ago: if Egypt is to progress at all it must abandon the delusions of some transformatory triumph over the Zionists. Other illusions, however, remained in place. All the texts of Pan-Arabism are premised on the centrality of Egypt. Egypt is the geographical bond between the Maghreb to the West and the Fertile Crescent, the Levant, and the great deserts to the East, a crossroads, a bridge. Demagogues such as Nasser liked the premise. Promising grandeurs, lost and retrievable, Pan-Arabism deflected from the enormities of the present, mesmerized and mobilized. But the country's history militates against the premise. What Egypt has truly in common with Saudi Arabia is discernible to neither eye nor mind. Islam you may meet. But the austere Wahabism of the Arabian peninsula, not only dominating but defining, is of a world utterly different from the matter-of-fact religion here. "Beneath the skin of every Egyptian," a new friend I made insisted, "lies contempt for the Arabs." Contempt is never admirable; but the next time some pundit on MacNeil-Lehrer tells you that "the Arab street" will rise in Cairo, you'd be wise to grapple with this contempt and this distance.

I SAW MOHAMMED HEIKAL TWICE. He is the old lion of Nasserite Pan-Arabism, the tutor to Nasser's instincts, one might say. Elegant, cosmopolitan, tolerant, he talks well and listens well. He believes that Arab identity is an expression of the Arabic language, and that its power will reassert itself once the failure of the Arab states to become nation-states is finally palpable beyond doubt and beyond avarice. But isn't Egypt a successful nation-state? This is the question I should have asked but didn't. I did ask what would happen at the peace talks. "Nothing," Heikal answered, "because the Palestinians have nothing to give."

THE EGYPTIANS HAVE DONE WELL by their peace with Israel. And they did extremely well with their five casualties in the Gulf war. Every kid on the street who asked where we're from responded to our "America" answer by chanting, "Bush, Bush, Bush," even those who pursued us for baksheesh. It's apt. Bush is exquisitely sensitive to Egypt's needs, and asks little in return. The papers and TV news remain hostile to Israel. The media charged while we were there that Israel was trying to subvert Egypt by spreading AIDS in the country. One paper wrote that the assassination of the U.N. mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1947 by the Stern Gang initiated terrorism in the Arab world. The Nazi analogy is a commonplace. Cairo is once again the headquarters of the Arab League, and one recalls that it was Egypt that kept reassuring the State Department of Iraq's peaceful intentions. But, then, there were 2 million Egyptians working in Iraq, half of them still there. What else could Cairo do? The problem is that Egypt is held hostage to something all over the Arab world: a million laborers in Libya, several billion dollars from the oil states, contingent waves of Islamic Salvationism from Algeria and the Sudan, with electoral victories already registered among Egypt's guilds of engineers and health workers. Is this an augury of the reign of virtue or simply a sign of impatience with the 40-year-old regime of the military?

IT IS A STABLE SOCIETY, NONETHEless. The optimists say this stability prefigures an era of growth and creativity. One of them says that peace with Israel has already brought with it agricultural know-how of great value with more to follow. Another says nothing will ever compensate for "the damage done to the soil by the Aswan Dam." A third asks where Egypt would have gotten electric power without it? A fourth says it destroyed the culture of the Nubians. This is the banter of a lively people, the banter, if you'll forgive the reminant banality of the day, of civil society. But civil society lives in the interstices. A wonderfully insolent underground music is officially banned and circulates illegally. The media hardly deal with the life of Egypt proper. One night last week, the TV news began with "President Mubarak met today with the president of Rwanda. They issued a communiqué pledging a common attitude to the Arab-Israel dispute.... President Mubarak met today with representatives of a development company from the Gulf.... The Papal Nuncio visited President Mubarak today along with the Primates of ..." I forget where.

EGYPT IS NOT A MODERNIZING society because true modernization—the modernization of politics and economy—would mean risking the prerogatives of the state and of the docile bourgeoisie that is its silent partner. On our last night in Cairo I went to a lecture by Mohammed Nuh, a great actor, director, librettist, composer for the Egyptian stage, a lapsed Nasserite but now too well-known, too gifted to be squelched. The regime wouldn't dare. His talk, ostensibly on the state of the musical theater, was really about how the regime, first in thrall to revolution, then in thrall to quietude, had smothered the spirits of a spirited people. Nuh evoked the brilliant life of prerevolutionary Egypt—theaters, symphonies, songs—a culture looking north and west to enrich itself. The officers' regime took all these under its own sway, and silenced them by shutting them down. Nuh is a free spirit, and it resonates with others. But they are not many in number. Thirty people came to this talk. Thoughts do not have many consequences. At least not here; not yet.

MARTIN PERETZ

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

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

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